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AN AMERICAN ODDITY:
THE LAW, HISTORY, AND TOLL OF THE SCHOOL
DISTRICT
Nadav Shoked
ABSTRACT—The school district is a staple of American law. As the local
government tasked with controlling our public schools, the school district is
so well-entrenched that lawmakers and commentators ignore its uniqueness
as a legal institution. The school district is peculiar to American law, and it
is a peculiarity within American law. General purpose governments—cities
and counties—are the local governments controlling schools outside the
United States. In the United States itself, these governments control almost
all other major local functions. But they do not control education here.
Why? Why does American law rely on a separate local government for the
provision of education? This Article tackles this fundamental—yet
heretofore largely neglected—historical and normative question. It offers a
legal history of the school district, tracing its roots to colonial
Massachusetts and chronicling its consolidation and spread through
successive centuries. This exploration demonstrates that the school district
was adopted as an expedient solution to varied practical problems
presented by the unique patterns of early settlement that prevailed in
different places and times in American history. Yet the historical
investigation additionally shows that at distinct periods lawmakers,
commentators, and activists also asserted substantive arguments, of
potentially enduring relevance, for the school district’s embrace. These
actors ascribed to the school district a capacity to outperform other, general
purpose, local governments in promoting certain core values. Those
normative values included citizen participation, community building,
school improvement through expert management, and stable school
funding. Unfortunately, due to modern legal, economic, and social
developments, the current school district fails to serve any of these values
that were at times attributed to its antecedents; worse, the contemporary
school district often undermines them. Accordingly, the Article concludes
that state lawmakers should consider abolishing the school district and
bestowing control over schools on general governments.
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In the first place God made idiots. This was for practice. Then he made
school boards.
—Mark Twain, Following the Equator: A Journey Around the World (1897)
INTRODUCTION
An hour’s drive north of New York City, a public school system is in
dire straits. In 2013–2014, 46% of the students in the East Ramapo system,
located in suburban Rockland County, New York, were “well below
proficient” in English, and a whopping 55% attained that distinction in
math.1 The students’ academic performance could not have been aided by
the system’s constant elimination of teacher positions and closing of
schools.2 A state report thus characterized the system as “in crisis.” It
singled out the cause: East Ramapo’s uniquely generous funding of private
schools. The local public school system serves 9,000 students, while the
area’s remaining 24,000 school-aged children attend private schools.
Students in the public schools are 91% African-American, Latino, or of
Haitian descent, and 78% of them are poor.3 The students in the private
schools, on the other hand, are all white Hasidim (i.e., members of an ultraorthodox Jewish sect).4 For years, the elected entity running the East
Ramapo school system has been diverting resources towards these latter
students in the private schools,5 thereby establishing a public school system
cash-starved by design.
1

HENRY M. GREENBERG, N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP’T, EAST RAMAPO: A SCHOOL DISTRICT IN CRISIS
7–8 (2014) (citing data from New York State school report cards).
2
Id. at 29–32. Another report highlights the board’s failure to address disadvantaged students’
academic needs. N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP’T, OFFICE OF BILINGUAL EDUCATION AND WORLD
LANGUAGES MONITORING REPORT (2015), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2109116/
states-east-ramapo-ell-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QP9A-RS6S].
3
GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 6.
4
Id.
5
A vast, growing, and grossly out of line with the state average portion of the district’s budget is
dedicated to funding transportation and special education at private schools. Id. at 12, 15–17. In an
extraordinary move, the state education commissioner rescinded her approval for the district’s 2017–
2018 budget, since it included increased funding for private school transportation (on days public
schools are not open) despite cuts elsewhere. Letter from MaryEllen Elia, Comm’r, N.Y. State Educ.
Dep’t, to Yehuda Weissmandl, President, Bd. of Educ., E. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist. (Apr. 21, 2017),
http://www.ercsd.org/files/_bVDyC_/5f88d30a41a6a3d33745a49013852ec4/Elia_to_Weissmandl_re_
budget_-_04-21-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJT4-WQY8]. Earlier, the federal Department of Education’s
Office for Civil Rights considered NAACP complaints about racial and religious discrimination and
began monitoring the district’s procedures for placement of special education students in out-of-district
schools (procedures which favored white children). Letter from Timothy Blanchard, Dir., N.Y. Office,
to Willie Trotman, President, Spring Valley NAACP (Oct. 27, 2015), https://poweroften.us/wp-content/
uploads/2015/11/Determination-Letter-Spring-Valley-NAACP-East-Ramapo-CSD-02-11-1091-and-0215-1140.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8QY-DYH8]. Both students and taxpayers have challenged the school
board’s diversion of funds as a breach of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. Recently, the
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An hour’s drive west of New York City, public schools are also
foundering. From 1950 to 2010, the population of Newark, New Jersey’s
largest city, plummeted from 440,000 to 275,000, as employers and
affluent residents decamped to the suburbs.6 The city’s student body
became almost exclusively disadvantaged: of its 35,000 students, 16,500
are African-American, 15,700 are Hispanic,7 and 15,000 (44%) live below
the poverty line.8 Drawing on dwindling property tax revenues to serve this
impoverished population, for years the system’s performance was, state
officials concluded, “abysmal.”9 But in 2010 the system struck gold.
Flanked by New Jersey’s governor and Newark’s mayor, Facebook founder
Mark Zuckerberg pledged one hundred million dollars to the system—a
sum other donors then matched.10 For Newark schools, money was no
longer a problem. Still, five years following that historic announcement,
with all the money spent, administered tests indicated that proficiency
throughout the system in literacy and math had declined in every tested
grade.11 The most thorough study of the grant assessed its effect as, at best,
“a wash.”12 The study singled out the cause. The governor controlled the
entity running the school system,13 and hence that entity could not

students’ lawsuit was dismissed by the Second Circuit for lack of standing. Montesa v. Schwartz,
836 F.3d 176, 201 (2d Cir. 2016). The taxpayers’ lawsuit is still ongoing in the district court.
6
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NEW JERSEY: 2010, SUMMARY POPULATION AND HOUSING
CHARACTERISTICS 14 (2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/cph-1-32.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F6BR-NAZT]; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1950 CENSUS 30-9 (1952).
7
NEWARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DISTRICT INFORMATION, http://www.nps.k12.nj.us/info/ [https://
perma.cc/XNS3-SJMS].
8
Dale Russakoff, Schooled, NEW YORKER, May 19, 2014.
9
Contini v. Bd. of Educ., 668 A.2d 434, 438 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995). The judge also
noted “the low level of school attendance in Newark, the high level of students who ‘drop out’ after
eighth grade[,] . . . the ‘deplorable condition of some of the physical facilities,’ the unavailability of
textbooks, workbooks and other vital instructional materials in many schools” and cited the state
education commissioner’s conclusion that “pupil performance data indicates . . . an utter failure by the
[schools] to prepare [their] students to function as citizens and workers in society.” Id.
10
Richard Pérez-Peña, Facebook Founder to Donate $100 Million to Help Remake Newark’s
Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/education/23newark.html
[https://perma.cc/TE5F-UNF9]; Ruth Marcus, How Newark Schools Partially Squandered Mark
Zuckerberg’s $100 Million Donation, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/how-newark-schools-partially-squandered-a-great-prize/2015/10/20/ffff660c-7743-11e5-a958d889faf561dc_story.html?utm_term=.89709d20f20f [https://perma.cc/3MTM-MBTK].
11
DALE RUSSAKOFF, THE PRIZE 204 (2015).
12
Tom Moran, Opinion, Newark Students Are Better Off, Despite the Political Noise, NEWARK
STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 6, 2015.
13
Contini, 668 A.2d at 437 (approving the takeover).
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effectively engage the local community and the teachers’ union in the
implementation of an improvement plan.14
Two geographically proximate school systems. Both failing—though
not due to the traditional culprit for the struggles of postwar American
public schools: outsiders’ apathy.15 In East Ramapo, the majority of the
public school system’s own residents, ultra-orthodox Jews who do not rely
on public schools, elected officials intent on defunding schools serving
others—the system’s minority residents.16 In Newark, the majority of the
school system’s residents were excluded from its management and
consequently would not cooperate with efforts to effectively employ funds
outsiders had dedicated to the system. A similar, and noteworthy, fate was
reached by both systems, through two different paths. While East
Ramapo’s schools were saddled with an overinclusive electorate, Newark’s
schools contended with an underinclusive one.
These two seemingly disparate predicaments share more than the
common unfortunate outcome each has bred, however. They are both
symptoms of one common ailment: the curious legal entity running both
school systems. The East Ramapo schools probably would not have been
underfunded by locals had they been controlled by the Villages of Spring
Valley and Chestnut Ridge, the Town of Haverstraw, and the other
communities whose residents actually send their children to East Ramapo’s
public schools. The Newark schools’ plans would not have been so
forcefully resisted by locals as external dictates had the schools been
controlled by the City of Newark, which answers to Newark’s residents.
But in neither case were the schools managed by the traditional local
government entities: the town, village, or city. Rather, the schools were
managed by another, separate entity: the East Ramapo Central School
District (that, unlike the villages and towns where the schools’ users reside,
answers also to non-school users) and the Newark School District (that,
14

David Kirp, How to Fix the Country’s Failing Schools. And How Not To., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/opinion/sunday/how-to-fix-the-countrys-failing-schoolsand-how-not-to.html [https://perma.cc/F4D3-C624]; James Piereson & Naomi Schaefer Riley, Opinion,
Zuckerberg’s $100 Million Lesson, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2015, 7:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/zuckerbergs-100-million-lesson-1444087064 [https://perma.cc/YH5N-K65C].
15
Under federal law, Americans need not contribute to the funding of schools serving other locales.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973). This decision “may be the most
significant decision regarding public schools since Brown.” John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School
Funding Litigation: Who’s Winning the War?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2351, 2352 (2004). On the ruling’s
effects, see, for example, James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 258–60
(1999).
16
GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 10 (noting that since 2005, a majority of the board has been
comprised of members of the Hasidic community, which today holds seven of the nine seats on the
board).

949

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

unlike the city, can be subjected to gubernatorial control).17 But what is this
curious entity—this “school district”?
The entity’s contours and governance scheme do not correspond to
existing, and primary, local political communities: in East Ramapo it
encompasses multiple such communities, while in Newark it is managed by
outsiders. Yet this entity still runs the schools. Why? Does this legal entity
provide East Ramapo and Newark tangible benefits justifying the
pathologies of representation it generates?
These questions are important. For this legal entity—the school
district—is not peculiar to East Ramapo and Newark. The school district is
the basic building block of the public schooling system throughout the
nation, an inexorable component of the legal architecture of governance in
America.18 Why has American law created the entity known as the school
district? Why, that is, has it established a special, independent local
government entity to run the schools? What are the expected advantages of
this autonomous entity, and can they offset its potential costs—some of
them showcased in East Ramapo and Newark?
This Article will tackle these questions, which heretofore have been
largely left unaddressed—indeed, unasked. Although the school district is a
reality of extraordinary consequence, as an institution, the district has
remained mostly invisible to legal scholars.19 While prominent recent
works have explored the legal standing of different local government
entities—city,20 county,21 special district,22 unincorporated urban area,23

17

School districts can be placed under state control. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-15.1 (West 2013).
A city can be placed under “supervision,” but its political leadership cannot be removed. Id. § 52:27BB56.
18
All states other than Hawaii rely on school districts. See infra Section I.A.1.
19
Writers have addressed school districts’ distributive effects. E.g., Richard Thompson Ford, The
Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1874–77 (1994);
Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise of Brown: Understanding and Remedying How
the Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized Segregated Schools, 88 N.C. L. REV. 787 (2010). These works
do not address the district’s institutional uniqueness. Quite the opposite: they aim to show that school
districts exhibit the general problem presented by local government boundaries. See Richard Briffault,
The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1132–41
(1996). The key exception that does address the district as a special institution is another important
essay by Richard Briffault: Richard Briffault, The Local School District in American Law, in BESIEGED
24 (William Howell ed., 2005). That essay’s focus is mostly the district–state interface, not the district’s
relationships with, and standing among, other local governments.
20
See, e.g., Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980).
21
Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 931 (2010).
22
Nadav Shoked, Quasi-Cities, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1971 (2013).
23
Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2008).
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extraterritorial zone,24 neighborhood25—the school district still awaits
thorough analysis.
This academic neglect is particularly striking since the school
district’s peculiarity cries out for an explanation. Education is one of the
key powers reserved to local governments,26 and it garners nearly 40% of
local budgets nationwide.27 Yet education is the sole major local function
whose administration has been consistently withdrawn from the purview of
primary local governments—cities and counties—and entrusted to separate,
and special, governments.28
Furthermore, the school district is not only peerless in American law:
it also lacks an equivalent elsewhere. Foreign legal systems that opt to
preserve a role for localities in governing schools29 rely on existing local
governments: cities and counties.30 They do not consistently rely on a
24

Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, supra note 19.
Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323 (2014).
26
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
27
See TAX FOUND., FACTS AND FIGURES ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE 263 tbl.F-5 (2004),
https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/7ca0eadb3813bc30417c0a3533491263.pdf [https://perma.cc/
STT6-ENB8] (indicating that 38% of municipal spending in 2002 was on education).
28
In American law, special districts are service-oriented bodies assigned humble, non-politicallycharged tasks, e.g., mosquito abatement and sewage. Shoked, supra note 22, at 1973.
29
Most systems centralize powers on the national or state level instead. E.g., NANCY WALSER, THE
ESSENTIAL SCHOOL BOARD BOOK xi–xii (2009) (discussing Australia); OECD, EDUCATION POLICY
OUTLOOK:
NEW
ZEALAND
15
(2013),
http://www.oecd.org/education/
EDUCATION%20POLICY%20OUTLOOK%20NEW%20ZEALAND_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
4U9V-2A83]; CODE DE L’ÉDUCATION [C. ÉD.] [EDUCATION CODE] art. L211-1 (Fr.),
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071191&idArticle=
LEGIARTI000006524493 [https://perma.cc/MWL8-XSG6] (“[E]ducation is a national service, whose
organization and functioning are assured by the state . . . .”).
30
See, e.g., Education Act 1902, 2 Edw. 7 c. 42, § 1 (Eng. & Wales) (“[T]he council of every
county and of every county borough shall be the local education authority.”); Education Act 1945, 8 &
9 Geo. 6 c. 67 (Scot.) (same); Compulsory Education Law, 5709–1949, § 1 (Isr.) (same); BRIGITTE
LOHMAR & THOMAS ECKHARDT, THE EDUCATION SYSTEM IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
2013/2014, at 54 (2015), http://www.istp2016.org/fileadmin/Redaktion/Dokumente/documentation/
dossier_en_ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/YLV9-ZPDT] (explaining that while the state is responsible for
“internal school matters”—curriculum and teachers—”the school-maintaining bodies” for “external
school matters”—e.g., school building and shutting down—are local authorities: towns and cities).
Canadian provinces seemingly follow the American example and recognize school districts, but their
goal is to accommodate disparate linguistic (and sometimes religious) communities cohabitating in the
same locality. The federal charter mandates that parents be able to draw on schools of their language
(French or English). Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, § 23 (UK). Furthermore, for some provinces, the
federal constitution requires “separate” school boards for the local minority religious group (Catholic or
Protestant). Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, § 93(2) (UK). Consequently, the same area may
be covered by four school boards—English Protestant (often referred to as English-language “public”),
English Catholic (often referred to as English-language “separate”), French Protestant (often referred to
as French-language “public”), and French Catholic (often referred to as French-language “separate”)—
each board elected only by its supporters.
25
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separate local entity to govern educational matters.31 The school district is
thus a quintessentially American invention.
This Article recounts the legal tale of this unique piece of Americana.
That tale is doctrinal and normative, but also historical. The school district
emerged early on, during colonial times, and to understand its current legal
role, benefits, and costs, the forgotten process by which it was initially
created back in colonial Massachusetts—and by which American law has
been recreating it ever since—must be unearthed.
As that process unfolded over the centuries, desires to assure efficient
education, to promote democracy, and to advance social cohesion, all
swirled around the school district.32 The district’s supporters offered it as an
institution better equipped, as compared to existing local governments, to
serve these goals. This multiplicity of goals explains the school district’s
stranglehold on American normative imaginations. Inevitable tensions exist
between these diverse values—for example, between democratic school
governance and expertise-driven school management. At times these
tensions bubbled over.33 Detractors would denounce the law’s embrace of
the school district as doing little to advance the value they cherished most.
Still, since the entity’s separate legal standing could always be credited
with serving some values—even if at others’ expense—it maintained
backers.34 Furthermore, since in some way the school district’s separate
standing was associated with all pertinent values, detractors advocated
adjustments to the district so that it could better promote the value they
prioritized, rather than called for its outright abolition.35
The school district has endured thanks to this pliability. The school
district is as much a staple of American law in 2017 as it was in 1717, since
it has been associated with a plethora of normative values. Indeed, with all
the values typically attributed to local governments—citizen participation,
efficient provision of public services, and community building.36 But the

31

England experimented with school boards upon the introduction of its public schools in 1870.
Elementary Education Act 1870, 33 & 34 Vict c. 75 (Eng. & Wales). But that system was abolished by
the 1902 Act. Education Act 1902, 2 Edw. 7 c. 42, § 5 (Eng. & Wales). Scotland’s boards were
similarly abolished in 1929. Local Government (Scotland) Act 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5 ch. 25, § 3 (UK).
In 1986, the London Education Authority was made independent again, Local Government Act 1985, c.
51, § 18 (UK), but it was eliminated in 1990. Education Reform Act 1988, c. 40, § 162 (UK) (decreeing
that the London Education Authority shall cease to exist on April 1, 1990).
32
See infra Section II.D.
33
See infra Sections II.B–C.
34
See, e.g., infra Section II.C.
35
E.g., JESSE H. NEWLON, EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AS SOCIAL POLICY 230 (1934).
36
On the competing normative values assigned to local power, see, for example, Richard Briffault,
Our Localism: Part II–Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 392–403 (1990).
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misfortune today—a misfortune to which East Ramapo and Newark are sad
testaments—is that the school district can no longer serve any of those
vaunted values. A slew of twentieth-century court decisions and laws,
political patterns, demographic shifts, and economic trends have conspired
to cripple the school district’s ability to deliver on any of its normative
promises. Thus, for example, the separately elected school district’s
promise of securing the citizenry’s role in running the schools has been
undermined by the advent of modern interest group dynamics.37 The
separately governed school district’s promise of assuring stable school
funding has been defeated by novel municipal tax laws that transformed
school districts’ autonomy into a tool for funneling funds away from
schools.38 Other historic justifications for the separate school district have
similarly crumbled.
Today’s school district not only fails to serve the justifications it was
previously set to promote; more often than not, it actively subverts them.
Accordingly, this Article’s centuries-long story of the school district
concludes with a call for abandoning this American oddity. Normalcy—
local government law’s usual principles—should reign in the education
field. The power to govern schools should be transferred to existing,
general purpose local governments—the governments responsible for
almost all other major local services. These governments now benefit from
their modern remodeling through innovations such as civil service laws,
and draw on novel legal tools such as interlocal contracts. Consequently,
unlike in the past, they can effectively manage schools and promote the
normative values once associated with the school district.39
This proposal to eradicate school districts is radical but not unrealistic.
Alerted by public education’s sad state, which is now conceived as a
national crisis,40 some lawmakers have begun to examine the role school
districts play.41 Several states have even begun altering existing regimes.42
But in the absence of a full appreciation of the legal problem the school

37

See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.D.
39
See infra Part IV.
40
NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, A NATION AT RISK (1983),
https://www2.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/risk.html [https://perma.cc/NT3V-M8KE] (famously warning
that “a rising tide of mediocrity” in schools is weakening the country in a competitive global economy).
41
The title picked for a recent book about boards expresses this attitude: besieged. See supra note
19. For a summary of criticisms, see MICHAEL W. KIRST & FREDERICK M. WIRT, THE POLITICAL
DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 131 (4th ed. 2009).
42
See infra Part IV.
38
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district presents, such reforms are prone to be partial.43 They may even
compound the problem, as they have in Newark, where the governor was
awarded control over the school district.44 As exemplified by that case,
tinkering with the district is not enough.
To reach this conclusion, the Article proceeds as follows. Part I draws
the landscape of education’s governance. It offers a comprehensive
portrayal of the legal relationship between the school district and other
local governments. This review demonstrates the school district’s central
role and its uniqueness in American law. Part II chronicles the emergence
and evolution of this unique component of our governmental system.
Tracing the school district’s development from colonial times to the
twentieth century, it offers the first legal history of the school district.45
This exercise shows that the school district was a creature of particular
historical circumstances—notably, the dearth of local government bodies
when public education was first introduced in disparate places. But the
account also synthesizes principled grounds intermittently—but
repeatedly—employed to fortify the detachment of schools’ governance
from the governance of other local affairs. Part III then explains why these
diverse normative reasons are no longer valid today. It reviews the
detrimental effects of legal, economic, social, and political transformations
on the school district’s capacity to promote the normative goals identified
in Part II. In light of the discouraging findings respecting the school
district’s current normative worth, Part IV turns to the district’s alternative:
general local governments, highlighting attributes rendering them the better
option for running schools today. It situates the Article’s suggestion among
other reform efforts—most notably, mayoral takeovers of school districts.
Such reforms’ animating principles, as well as shortcomings, strengthen the
conclusion: the school district is a legal institution whose time has come
and gone.

43

Reforms aim at “reorganizing” school districts, rather than rethinking them. E.g., IND. CODE
§ 20-23-4-1 (2016).
44
See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
45
Scholars have authored histories of education, e.g., DIANE RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS
(1974); LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 1783–1876
(1980), but not of the school district. One economist claiming to tackle the problem merely explains the
consolidation of one-room schools into bigger schools in the early twentieth century. William A.
Fischel, Neither “Creatures of the State” Nor “Accidents of Geography”: The Creation of American
Public School Districts in the Twentieth Century, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 177–78 (2010).
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I.

THE LAW OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT

In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court proclaimed
education “the most important function of state and local governments.”46
However, as the identity of the defendant in that seminal case indicated,
this most important function is not performed by the state itself or by its
primary local governments. Rather, it is entrusted to a special government:
the board of education, also referred to as the school board or district. This
introductory Part sketches the school board’s institutional architecture. This
exercise is important even independent of the ensuing Parts’ analysis, as
education governance’s complicated legal structure has engendered some
misunderstandings.47 This Part will sort out confusions by defining the
district’s place in American law: first surveying the distribution of
educational powers among the different layers of government (federal,
state, and local); then detailing the school district’s nature as the local layer
of government responsible for education; and finally clarifying the legal
ramifications of the school district’s interactions with other local layer
governments. From this analysis, the school district will appear as an
important local government—the government awarded the legal
responsibility for school management in America. Furthermore, it will
emerge as a local government different in its legal standing from other
special local governments similarly tasked with the provision of one
specific service, and as a government that is also, almost always, politically
independent from general local governments.
A.

The State and Education

In the federal constitutional scheme, education is a power reserved to
the states.48 For their part, all state constitutions decree that the state
provide education.49 To implement this mandate, the states install a chief
state school officer, and forty-seven states also empower a state board of
education.50 The chief school officer and state board members are
appointed by the governor or elected by the citizens.51 The powers and
46

347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
See infra Section I.C.
48
On limited federal involvement, see GENE MAEROFF, SCHOOL BOARDS IN AMERICA 101–05
(2010).
49
See Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation,
28 HARV. J. LEGIS. 307, 311 (1991).
50
Mary Fulton, State Education Governance Models, STATENOTES (2011), http://www.ecs.org/
clearinghouse/77/78/7778.pdf [https://perma.cc/AWL4-2PYQ].
51
A breakdown by state is available at: VINCENT SCUDELLA, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES,
STATE EDUCATION GOVERNANCE MODELS (2013), http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/01/08/70/
10870.pdf [https://perma.cc/DGE2-NZT2].
47
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duties of these state-level officials typically include certificating teachers,52
establishing school building codes,53 dispersing federal funds,54 calculating
state aid,55 collecting student and instructional data,56 and setting
instructional standards.57
All these tasks are supervisory: the state bodies monitor the public
schools.58 Other than in Hawaii,59 state bodies leave actual management of
schools to local entities: school boards.60 School boards govern
geographical subdivisions of the state, often called school districts.61 As of
2012, 12,880 districts existed nationwide (as compared to 19,519 cities and
villages).62
Like all other local governments, school districts are formally
creatures of the state.63 Lacking inherent powers, they are political
subdivisions established, maintained, and potentially abolished by the
state.64 They hold only the powers state laws grant them, which are
invariably subject to change.65 State laws commonly grant school districts
powers to appoint teachers and prescribe salaries,66 select courses and
52

Illinois provides a typical example. See, e.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-3.9 (2012).
See, e.g., id. at 5/2-3.12.
54
See, e.g., id. at 5/2-3.26.
55
See, e.g., id. at 5/2-3.84.
56
See, e.g., id. at 5/2-3.31.
57
See, e.g., id. at 5/27-1.
58
See, e.g., id. at 5/2-3.3.
59
HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1128 (2010) (granting the state board control over all schools).
60
2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1968, at 430 (1973)
(explaining that Hawaii’s system is unique). In several states, constitutions establish districts. See, e.g.,
COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 15; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 4; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 7.
61
1–3 JAMES RAPP, EDUCATION LAW § 303(2) (last updated 2016).
62
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INDIVIDUAL STATE DESCRIPTIONS: 2012, at viii–x (2013),
https://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/2012isd.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6J9-Q2U8].
63
Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907) (“The State, therefore, at its pleasure may
modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or
vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with
another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally
or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these
respects the State is supreme . . . .”).
64
Fruit v. Metro. Sch. Dist., 172 N.E.2d 864, 866 (Ind. 1961) (“It is for the legislature to determine
whether the administration of school systems shall be exercised by a state board or distributed to local
school corporations.”); Tecumseh Sch. Dist. v. Throckmorton, 403 P.2d 102, 104 (Kan. 1965)
(“[S]chool districts are purely creatures of the legislature and subject not only to its power to create but
its power to modify or dissolve.”); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 160.020 (2015) (setting
circumstances wherein a school district dissolves).
65
Sch. Dist. of Lansing v. State Bd. of Educ., 116 N.W.2d. 866, 869 (Mich. 1962) (“[E]ducation is
not inherently a part of the local self-government of a municipality except insofar as the legislature may
choose to make it such.”).
66
See, e.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-20.7 (2012).
53
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textbooks,67 and assign students to specific schools.68 School districts are
also tasked with establishing schools: they open schools,69 replace sites,70
and close schools.71
B.

The School District as a Special Local Government

The school district is thus the local government responsible for the
individual schools located within a defined area. American law recognizes
many forms of local governments, and a local government’s standing
differs with its form. Therefore, to grasp the school district’s nature, its
specific status among local governments’ different forms must be
pinpointed.
Local government law distinguishes “general purpose” governments
from “special purpose” governments.72 General purpose governments are
subject to a plethora of rules concerning elections, financing, and
administration.73 Special purpose governments, also known as special
districts, are excused from many of these rules.74 The characteristics
rendering a local government “special” and thus exempt from such
regulation are contested.75 Traditional categorizations focus on special
districts’ limited powers.76 Thus, governments exercising powers in
multiple fields are deemed general, whereas governments whose authority
is confined to a single field are considered special. Accordingly, for
example, counties and cities are general governments, whereas water
districts and housing authorities are special governments.
Seeing that its functions are limited to a single purpose,77 the school
district resembles the special government or district, and state laws often
list the two side-by-side.78 Still, and as Justice Potter Stewart once noted, a
school district “has a more pervasive influence in the community than do
most other such special purpose authorities.”79 The reason is the enhanced
social import of the service the school district provides—education—as
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

See, e.g., id. at 5/10-20.8.
See, e.g., id. at 5/10-21.3.
See, e.g., id. at 5/10-22.36.
See, e.g., id. at 5/10-22.13.
See, e.g., id. at 5/10-22.22b.
LYNN BAKER ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 53 (5th ed. 2015).
Shoked, supra note 22, at 1987–90.
Id.
Id. at 1991–99.
Id.
See, e.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-20 (2012).
E.g., ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 8.
Kramer v. Union Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 640 n.9 (1969) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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compared to those delivered by other special districts (such as water
districts and housing authorities).80 This is perhaps a “difference in degree,”
yet courts have found it meaningful.81 Education’s public significance has
led courts to subject school districts to regulations from which other special
districts are spared, such as constitutional rules of citizen representation.82
Consequently, the U.S. Census separates school districts from other special
districts.83
C.

The School District and General Local Governments

Since it discharges the “most important function of local
government,”84 the school district is a “special” special purpose local
government. Still, it remains a special purpose local government: it is not
the primary local government serving an area. That primary government,
commonly viewed by residents as their politically constitutive community,
is the presiding general purpose government.85
The degree to which the school district is interlaced with this primary
government defines the district’s role in residents’ lives and its status in
American law. Two variables shape the relationship between the school
district and the general government: degree of physical likeness and extent
of political dependence. Each must be inspected separately.
1. School District Boundaries.—As a local government existing in
forty-nine states, the school district exerts power over a defined substate
area. The state delineates the boundaries of that area, as the school district
is a state creature.86 In twenty-three states those boundaries do not
correspond to the boundaries of general governments.87 That is, the area an
individual school district covers may straddle more than one city or county,
and the area covered by a city or county may be split between more than
one school district. An example of such an arrangement is the Houston
Independent School District, which does not cover the whole city of
Houston while concurrently covering other area municipalities in whole or
in part.
80

Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U.
CHI. L. REV. 339, 356 (1993).
81
Kramer, 395 U.S. at 640 n.9 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
82
Id.
83
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 62, at v.
84
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
85
BAKER ET AL., supra note 72, at 53–56.
86
E.g., IOWA CODE § 275.1(2) (2017) (mandating reorganization and attachment of school districts
in certain situations); id. § 275.3 (setting minimum size).
87
Data collected from state maps and regulations, on file with author.

958

111:945 (2017)

An American Oddity

In the remaining twenty-six states, school district boundaries follow
general governments’ boundaries.88 Variation exists among these states,
however, since American law recognizes more than one general
government whose boundaries can serve as template for an overlapping
school district. Almost all states carve their territory into counties and then
establish at least one more layer of general government below the county:
the city, town, township, or village, presiding over county subareas.89 Given
that multiple general governments could therefore reign over one area,
school district boundaries designed to follow general government
boundaries may take three different forms.90 In eight states school district
lines correspond to county lines.91 In nine they correspond to sub-county
general governments’ lines.92 The final nine states create school districts
whose borders follow both county and subcounty lines: a school district
exists tracing each county’s boundaries, while subareas within the county
incorporated as cities are excluded from the countywide school district,
each recognized as a separate school district whose boundaries trace the
city’s.93
2. School District Governance.—Geographical overlap between the
school district and a general government, found in some form in twenty-six
states, means that the school district serves the same population that the
overlapping general government (i.e., county or city) serves. It need not
mean that the school district serves that general government. The latter type
of relationship, which can be titled political overlap, implies that one body
rules both the general government and the school district.94 A school
district politically overlaps a general government if its governing board is
appointed by the general government, rather than elected separately by
residents.95 If such political overlap prevails, the general purpose local
government is the entity actually administering the schools, and the
88

Data collected from state maps and regulations, on file with author.
BAKER ET AL., supra note 72, at 54–55.
90
Data collected from state maps and regulations, on file with author.
91
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia.
92
California, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and
Vermont.
93
Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and
Tennessee.
94
Briffault, The Local School District in American Law, in BESIEGED, supra note 19, at 26–27.
95
This binary distinction is somewhat misleading. In actuality, and perhaps inevitably, the district’s
independence is a matter of degree. The separately elected district’s level of independence depends on
its powers. The more powerful the district, the more meaningful its political independence. Most
importantly, states differ in the extent of fiscal independence they award districts. The limits some of
them impose (for example, requiring the submission of the district’s budget to the general government)
are discussed infra notes 472–74 and accompanying text.
89
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overlapping school district is not a government, but rather a branch or
agency of that general government (the equivalent, for example, of the
general government’s sanitation department).96 If, on the other hand, the
school district is politically separate from the general government, then it is
an independent, and thus meaningful, government.97
This form of independent governance is the clear majority rule.98 The
almost uniform practice in America is to politically detach the board
managing the school district from the area’s general governments.99 In
thirty-one states, members of all local school boards are elected separately
by residents.100 In eighteen states, members of some boards are appointed:
by mayors101 or governors.102 But even within this minority of states that
establish some appointed boards, there are many other school boards that
are independently elected—indeed, the vast majority of local boards in

96

See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LISTS & STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENTS: DEFINITIONS,
https://www.census.gov/govs/go/definitions.html [https://perma.cc/NW5Z-48CB].
97
The Census, thus, only counts as governments those school districts categorized as
“independent,” classifying the other, “dependent,” school systems as mere government “agencies.” U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 62, at x. It finds 1,298 dependent school systems. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION SUMMARY REPORT: 2012, https://www.census.gov/content/dam/
Census/library/publications/2013/econ/g12-cg-org.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8BU-8J4C]. The test the
Census employs to separate dependent from independent school districts is opaque, however, Briffault,
The Local School District in American Law, in BESIEGED, supra note 19, at 26, and its results—
somewhat questionable. The Census singles out four states as containing no independent school
districts: Hawaii—which, as already noted, has no school districts—Alaska, Maryland, and North
Carolina. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 62, at x. Yet, a review of the laws of these other three states
reveals that they all insist on designating school districts as independent entities. See, e.g., Tunley v.
Anchorage Sch. Dist., 631 P.2d 67, 75 (Alaska 1980) (“While the school board is elected by the same
voters as is the municipal assembly . . . it is a legislative body with legal responsibilities which in
important respects are distinct from those exercised by the assembly.”). Maryland does empower the
governor to appoint boards, MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 3-108 (LexisNexis 2014), but eighteen
districts—of the state’s twenty-four—elect independent boards, id. § 3-114. In North Carolina, some
boards are city-appointed, e.g., ASHEVILLE CITY SCHOOLS, N.C., POLICY CODE: 2110 (Feb. 2, 1998),
http://www.ashevillecityschools.net/files/_xNKf7_/f07179dc6c6be12d3745a49013852ec4/2110.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2WEG-4MQW], but others are elected, e.g., CHAPEL HILL CARRBORO CITY SCHOOLS,
N.C.,
POLICY
CODE:
2110
(Apr.
23,
1998),
https://boardpolicyonline.com/bl/
?b=chaphill#&&hs=142497 [https://perma.cc/VPP5-QRR2]. The North Carolina Supreme Court
characterized the school district as “a governmental agency separate and distinct from the [c]ity.” State
v. Cooke, 103 S.E.2d 846, 850 (N.C. 1958).
98
MAEROFF, supra note 48, at 190 (“[F]ewer than 10 percent of the nation’s school board
members” are appointed.).
99
Briffault, The Local School District in American Law, in BESIEGED, supra note 19, at 27.
100
50-State Comparison: Local School Boards, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES (2017),
http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbquestRT?rep=K12G713 [https://perma.cc/6NHB-AR3C].
101
Id.; see, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-b(1)(a) (McKinney 2017) (describing New York City);
105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/34-3(b) (2016) (describing Chicago).
102
Local School Boards, supra note 100; see, e.g., supra note 17 (discussing New Jersey’s laws
allowing for state takeover of school districts and their use in Newark).
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those states are elected.103 Often an appointed board only reigns in the
state’s major city or cities.104 Importantly, even when the school board is
politically dependent on the general government, as it is in those few
places, it remains a separate legal entity.105 Hence, for example, an
appointed school district retains its separate financial standing106 and is
sued and sues discretely,107 while city bodies cannot interfere with its
decisions.108
School districts that are politically dependent on a general government
are thus atypical. Even in the few occasions where the district is politically
dependent on the general government, that government does not normally
control, nor is it liable for, the district’s acts. In American law, in sum, the
school district is almost always starkly dissimilar from city agencies—such
as police or licensing departments—which politically and legally are city
organs.
D.

Summary: The School District’s Unique Legal Position

American law treats education’s provision and management in a
unique fashion. The law’s approach stands out not because it entrusts the
task to local governments: many functions are similarly delegated to local
governments. Rather, the attitude towards education is striking due to the
identity of the local government picked. In contrast to its practice
103

For example, in South Carolina, only four of the eighty-one school districts are appointed. S.C.
SCHOOL BOARD ASS’N, BOARD MEMBER SELECTION AND MEETINGS (2016), http://scsba.org/general/
aboutus_schoolboardfacts_bdmemberselection.pdf [https://perma.cc/N886-TV3A]; see S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 59-19-40 (2016) (enabling variation between districts). Most often, only the largest city’s board is
appointed. See Local School Boards, supra note 100; see, e.g., supra note 101 (New York and
Chicago); 1991 MASS. ACTS 222–26 (Boston); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6-696 (2013) (Philadelphia). The
Pennsylvania provision, § 6-696, applies to districts of the “first class” and a separate state law
provision, 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 101, defines cities of the first class as those containing a population of
over one million—i.e., only Philadelphia.
104
See Local School Boards, supra note 100; see, e.g., supra note 101 (New York and Chicago);
1991 Mass. Acts 222–26 (Boston); 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6-696 (2013) (Philadelphia). The Pennsylvania
provision, § 6-696, applies to districts of the “first class” and a separate state law provision, 53 Pa. Stat.
Ann. § 101, defines cities of the first class as those containing a population of over one million—i.e.,
only Philadelphia.
105
E. EDMUND REUTTER, JR., THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 155 (4th ed. 1994) (“It is
essential . . . to stress here the basic separateness of [school district and general local governments].”).
106
See, e.g., Divisich v. Marshall, 22 N.E.2d 327, 328–29 (N.Y. 1939). Thus, they remain separate
borrowers and a city is not liable for district debt. See, e.g., Fran Spielman & Lauren FitzPatrick, Rahm
Likely Will Have to Rescue CPS, No Matter How Judge Rules, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Apr. 27, 2017, 6:24
PM),
http://chicago.suntimes.com/news/rahm-likely-will-have-to-rescue-cps-no-matter-how-judgerules/ [https://perma.cc/2MUT-KQ2W] (reporting on Chicago mayor’s lack of formal obligation—and
potential voluntary choice—to finance the school district’s debt, despite his control of the district).
107
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-17-10; Divisich, 22 N.E.2d at 328.
108
See, e.g., Divisich, 22 N.E.2d at 328.
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respecting other vital local functions, the law refrains from empowering
general local governments to supply and manage educational services.
Instead, laws establish special local governments—school districts—for
this purpose. These districts geographically overlap with general
governments in slightly more than half the states, yet they remain
politically and legally distinct from those governments nearly everywhere.
To underscore this peculiar legal nature, consider the resulting reality
prevalent in the twenty-six states mandating correlation between the
district’s geographical boundaries and those of a general government.
While the school district and the general government consequently serve
the same population in these states, state laws insist on preserving the
district’s political and legal detachment. Geography thus cannot be held
responsible for school governance’s separation from governance over other
local concerns—at least in these states. Law alone isolates it. The law
assures that in America, education is a local function administered like no
other. Detecting and assessing the motivations behind this strategy is the
ensuing discussion’s assignment.
II.

THE HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT

The school district, as Part I demonstrated, occupies a special place in
current American law. Why does the law rely on this peculiar institution?
What normative values sustain it? An effective way to understand the
rationales for the district’s existence is by tracing its evolution. This Part
presents the school district’s legal history. The discussion unfolds
chronologically, identifying transformative moments in the law’s approach
to public education’s management.
This Part’s story of the institution tasked with governing public
education thus commences in Section II.A with a discussion of colonial
Massachusetts: the birthplace, in America, of public schools, and, soon
thereafter, of the school district. The school district then came of age as
post-Independence America gradually grew into a democratic, capitalist,
and continental republic. Section II.B accordingly presents the
transmutations the school district underwent during the nineteenth century,
which catapulted it into a government staple throughout the land. As that
century neared conclusion, however, all established government precepts
and institutions were strained and questioned, and so was the school
district. Hence Section II.C focuses on the Progressive Era, when mass
industrialization and immigration, alongside an accompanying reformist
drive, reshaped the school district. The school district that emerged from
those tumultuous decades of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
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centuries is the institution we know today, as described in Part I.109
Therefore, after reviewing that portion of its history, this Part concludes
with a summary of the normative justifications that sustained the school
district throughout the different stages of its history, as discerned in the
Part’s three Sections.
A.

The Nascent School District: Public Education
in Colonial Massachusetts

1.

The Original Legal Obligation to Provide Education: Satan and
Local Power.—The starting point for a history of public education
in America must be colonial Massachusetts. From its beginning, the
Massachusetts Bay Colony was destined to blaze the trail for public
education in the New World. The settlement of other early colonies was
animated by material concerns;110 Massachusetts was different. It was
established in 1629 with the aim of creating a perfect society. Its Puritan
founders envisioned it “as a city upon a hill.”111 The biblical metaphor
embodied an aspiration that the new outpost prove to those left behind in
Europe that a community could be organized around Calvinist tenets.112
Such a utopian ideal of society mandated a commitment to the education of
the young.113 That commitment led, almost as a matter of course, to the
establishment of the first public school system in America. It also led, as a
matter of almost complete happenstance, to the establishment of the first
school districts in the English-speaking world.
Public education arrived on the colony’s shores early. In 1647, less
than two decades following colonization, the Massachusetts Bay Colony’s
legislature passed an act decreeing the creation of schools.114 The first

109

Kenneth K. Wong & Emily Farris, Governance in Urban School Systems: Redrawing
Institutional Boundaries, in SHAPING EDUCATION POLICY: POWER AND PROCESS 216 (Douglas E.
Mitchell et al. eds., 2011) (explaining that though their number changed significantly over the years,
districts’ design remained stable).
110
See EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF
COLONIAL VIRGINIA 45 (1975). Thus, throughout the colonial period, Virginia, for example, made no
provision for public education. CORNELIUS J. HEATWOLE, A HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA 58
(1916) (explaining that the only colonial laws in Virginia pertaining to the training of the young were
regulations limited to orphans and poor children).
111
GOVERNOR JOHN WINTHROP, A MODEL OF CHRISTIAN CHARITY (1630).
112
See PERRY MILLER, ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS 11–12 (1956).
113
CAROLINE BENN & CLYDE CHITTY, THIRTY YEARS ON: IS COMPREHENSIVE EDUCATION ALIVE
AND WELL OR STRUGGLING TO SURVIVE 1 (1996) (explaining that the modern concept of common
education emerged following the Reformation).
114
The Colony Records, 1642–1649, in 2 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 203 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., Boston, William White Press
1853) [hereinafter RECORDS OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY].
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public education law in the world,115 its preamble gave voice to its Puritan
underpinnings as it explained the law’s rationale: “It being one chief
project of [the] ould deluder, Satan, to keep men from the knowledge of
[the] Scriptures, . . . and to the end that learning may not be buried in [the]
grave of our forefathers. . . . ”116 The law proceeded to oblige smaller towns
to appoint a teacher, and towns numbering a hundred families or more to
operate a “gram[m]ar school[].”117 Towns in breach were assessed annual
fines.118
The “ould deluder Satan” act is widely recognized as a landmark
moment for American law: it inaugurated the public duty of providing
schooling.119 It is also historic, however, for rendering this duty a local—
rather than colonial—obligation. It thereby set the blueprint for future
American lawmakers. Yet, unlike modern lawmakers, the specific local
entity the Act singled out was not a special purpose, new government.
Rather, the onus was placed on existing, general governments—the towns
themselves—to fulfill schooling obligations.
2.

School Governance Through Independence: The Town
Displaced.—The obligation to maintain the schools under the
“ould deluder Satan” act shifted away from the general governments that
were its original repository and onto new and separate governments in a
gradual process that unfolded throughout the colonial era. This shift,
115

In Europe, at the time of the American Constitutional Convention, states did not meaningfully
provide education. In the Catholic countries, “education as an affair of the State had not been thought
of.” ELLWOOD P. CUBBERLEY, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 85 (1934). During the
Reformation, Martin Luther called for adoption of mandatory education laws and maintenance of
schools. MARTIN LUTHER, Letter to the Councilmen of All Cities in Germany That They Establish and
Maintain Christian Schools (1524), in 45 LUTHER’S WORKS 347 (Walther I. Brandt ed., 1962).
Reformed states sometimes followed the call, yet the schools were to be run by the church, not the state.
Thus, for example, as a result of the Scottish Reformation, the Scottish Privy Council adopted in 1616 a
law mandating the creation of public schools that were to be supervised by the Episcopal Church. The
School Establishment Act 1616, in 1 MISCELLANY OF THE MAITLAND CLUB: CONSISTING OF ORIGINAL
PAPERS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY AND LITERATURE OF SCOTLAND 22–
23 (1740).
116
RECORDS OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, supra note 114, at 203 (revised from original old English).
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Connecticut adopted an almost identical act in 1650. Code of Laws, Established by the General
Court, May, 1650, in PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 554–55 (J. Hammond
Trumbull ed., Hartford, Brown & Parsons 1850). New Hampshire, when it was separated from
Massachusetts in 1679, first adopted a law requiring towns to respect their current obligations towards,
among others, schoolmasters. Bounds & Powers of Towns, &c., June 1686, in 1 LAWS OF NEW
HAMPSHIRE: PROVINCE PERIOD 115 (Albert Stillman Batchellor ed., 1904). It then adopted an act
replicating the Massachusetts one. An Act for the Settlement & Support of Grammar Schools, May
1719, in 2 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE: PROVINCE PERIOD: 1702–1745, at 336 (Albert Stillman
Batchellor ed., 1913). Throughout colonial times, these were the lone states providing public schooling.
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completed by Independence, was precipitated by a confluence of two
distinct efforts to address two separate challenges, both generated by the
peculiar social circumstances and legal conditions of colonial
Massachusetts. One challenge afflicted school management in the colony’s
urban center, Boston. The other beset school management in the colony’s
rural communities. Boston’s predicament led to the stripping of
management responsibility from the general government, marking the
demise of the political overlap between the town government and the entity
governing the schools. The rural quandary was responsible for the erosion
of the geographical overlap between town boundaries and those of the
entity governing the schools.
a.

School governance in colonial Boston: the school
committee’s emergence.—In 1647, the year of the “ould
deluder Satan” law’s adoption, Boston appeared well-situated to implement
the Act’s edicts through its existing town government: Boston had already
established a public school, the continent’s first, more than a decade
earlier.120 But Boston’s governance structure would prove unfit to manage
schools, necessitating a new governance form—the school committee.
Boston faced problems in managing schools due to its unique status in
the era’s law. The common law of the seventeenth century established and
governed cities as royally chartered corporations.121 Several major colonial
cities assumed this guise.122 Boston’s residents, however, refused to
incorporate.123 Instead, Boston became a “quasi corporation”: it functioned
as a body politic and exercised corporate powers, but it lacked a charter.124
The adamant opposition to incorporation stemmed from colonists’
abhorrence—grounded in their Puritan, communitarian faith—of
government by a select few.125 The corporate form separates ownership
from management.126 Like the business corporation governed by a handful
of directors, a chartered English municipality was governed by a handful of
councilors. Such a form of government, the Bostonians asserted,
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Frug, supra note 20, at 1090–91.
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2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 419–21 (John M. Gould ed., 1896).
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PROPERTY 66–68, 112–13, 196–97 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932).
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“destroy[s] that equality which ought to subsist in all republic[]s.”127
Bostonians insisted on preserving the town’s existing form of government:
government through town meetings, where all freemen voted.128
Seeing that the town meeting was therefore the town’s sole legislative
body, it was such a meeting that decided, in 1635, to establish America’s
first public school—the Latin School.129 It was also through such townwide direct democracy that this school and others were managed. Town
meetings made major, school-related “policy” decisions—such as
taxation.130 They also settled minor daily management issues131 : the
schoolmaster was appointed by a town meeting vote,132 and teachers’
salaries and supplies were also sorted out there.133
Such heightened direct democracy was, however, unsustainable in the
long run. It was impractical to call a town meeting to discuss each minor
school-related issue whenever it arose. Thus, gradually, the town meeting
delegated daily management duties to the town’s selectmen: the town’s
executive committee.134 Between 1644 and 1689, almost all records of
school management in Boston are references to the selectmen’s acts or
instructions addressed at them.135 The selectmen assumed the task of hiring
teachers and of transacting in school lands.136 Over time, the practice was
codified: a 1654 Massachusetts act commended to the selectmen teacher
supervision and removal,137 and a 1693 act held them responsible, alongside
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the town meeting, for teachers’ maintenance.138 A 1711 act then placed the
power to certify teachers with the selectmen.139
But the degree to which the selectmen could improve on the town
meeting’s shortcomings in school management was checked. Selectmen
were limited in time, powers, and ability to acquire experience.140 They
lacked legislative capacities,141 and as executives their effectiveness was
curbed by the need to constantly stand for reelection: terms originally stood
at six months, and later at one year.142 The town’s scheme for school
governance needed further adjustment.143
That adjustment begot the first step towards the separate school board.
Beginning in the early eighteenth century, a mechanism was devised to aid
the selectmen in their challenge of supervising schools: periodically
appointed “visitation committees.”144 The first such committee was
appointed in 1709 on an ad hoc basis to seemingly treat a specific matter:
the Latin School master’s salary.145 But that committee exceeded its
mandate and advocated a permanent arrangement for effective school
supervision through appointing “inspectors of the school.”146 The town
meeting abided, first intermittently,147 then, starting in 1720, consistently.148
The town meeting initially assigned the visitation committee the task of
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visiting the schools and inspecting their performance. Later, the committee
began recommending teacher dismissals149 and instructing teachers.150
Throughout the closing decades of the colonial era, the visitation
committee established its presence within Boston’s governance scheme.151
Like committees in other fields, its creation owed to the town meeting’s
inability to provide specialized and ongoing administration.152 This need
delineated the committee’s role, including its close ties to the general town
government. The town meeting remained the legislative body governing
the schools,153 appointing, at its pleasure, the advisory visitation
committee—whose advice it always then followed.154
This informal, officially dependent committee, a creature of the
colonial era, was transformed into a formal school committee with separate
and established powers—into, that is, a “school board”—at the end of the
colonial era. In the Revolution’s aftermath, the town meeting appointed a
committee to draft a new school system.155 The 1789 drafting committee
had to settle a raging debate: in a free society, how public should public
schools be in ethos, constituency, and governance? Some prominent
Bostonians, like John Adams, fearing popular mobs unleashed by old
constraints’ collapse, believed that only the elite should participate in
government, and that high-level education should be its lot alone.156 Others,
led by Samuel Adams, condemned, as a threat to democracy, public
schools’ drift towards the model of exclusivity set by private schools.157
Through testimonials, the appointed drafting committee learned that
most Bostonians shared this second view.158 Residents desired public
schools that would instill, in a diverse student body, the values of the entire
community.159 Such schools, the committee reckoned, could not be
maintained through the existing governance system: visitation committees
consisted of notables, often appointed by the selectmen rather than the
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town people. A more representative body was desired.160 Yet, colonial
experience had taught that the town’s sole existing popular body—the town
meeting—was inadequate for the task.
Guided by the committee’s report, the town meeting proceeded to
solve this conundrum by erecting a new, popularly elected body to control
schools. An ordinance, “The System of Public Education,” was adopted.161
This ordinance lay, as one historian observed, “the foundation of the first
comprehensive system of public schools in any American city.”162 The
ordinance detailed the number of schools to exist in different
neighborhoods, students’ ages, and curriculum.163 Most importantly for our
purposes, it entrusted the schools’ management into the hands of a new
body: the “school committee.” This committee was to consist of twelve
members elected by residents. Its duties included regularly inspecting the
schools, devising rules for the schools’ management, setting school days
and hours, and determining instruction methods.164
This new school committee was the first continuous, politically
separate government controlling schools in history.165 Its genesis, as this
Section illustrated, can be attributed to early Boston’s peculiar quandaries:
an emerging metropolis whose population was dedicated to democratic
values yet lacked representative bodies.166 These unique local foundations
notwithstanding, the school committee model was—eventually—to spread
well beyond Boston.
b.

School governance in rural colonial Massachusetts: the
school district’s emergence.—While the crumbling of the
political overlap between school and general governance—the emergence
of the school committee—was the child of the colony’s urban center, the
breakdown of the geographical overlap between the school government’s
boundaries and the general government’s—the emergence of the school
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district—finds its origins in Massachusetts’s more rural areas. Originally,
like Boston, Massachusetts’s smaller communities governed schools
through town meetings.167 Unlike in Boston, direct control through town
meetings was sustainable as populations remained relatively small. The
problem these communities encountered in due course was different: the
spatial spread of their small populations rendered the town school itself
unsustainable.
At the outset of colonial settlement, all residences in a New England
town were located in vicinity to the town center, the site of its civic
institutions: town hall, church, and school.168 Puritan leanings mandated
closeness.169 But by the eighteenth century, religious commandments’ hold
lessened, while the allure of uncultivated land in town outskirts grew.170 As
a result, residents began migrating from the center.171 Such dispersal
complicated the town’s religious and civic life. Towns began subdividing
themselves into church parishes with their own ministers, to road districts
maintaining their own roads, and then into separate districts for militia
recruitment and tax collection.172 Such parishes and districts, though set for
specific goals, became the sites of political demands for new subtown
facilities, among them schools.173
The problem presented by the existing schooling system, revolving
around the town school, was apparent. As towns’ populations scattered,
fewer children could conveniently attend the town school.174 Parents hardly
relying on the school would only grudgingly commit taxes to fund it.175
Consequently, in the eighteenth century’s opening decades a growing
number of towns were fined for breaching their obligations under the “ould
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deluder Satan” law.176 A disapproving colonial legislature increased the
fines in 1702 and 1718.177
To avoid this increasingly costly liability, towns had to persuade
remote districts’ and parishes’ residents to pay taxes. After attempts at
moving the town school between districts178 were derailed by practical
hurdles,179 towns abandoned the idea of the town school altogether. They
succumbed to pressure from the parishes and districts and began operating
multiple schools—assigning a school to each district.180 Furthermore, the
town meeting ceded to each district’s residents control over their district’s
school.181 Local residents would not only pick their school’s site, but also
appoint teachers.182 In 1768 the colonial legislature endorsed the trend:
acknowledging the difficulty in providing schooling in towns’ remote
“precincts,” it empowered individual precincts to raise funds for their own
schools.183 Next came the landmark step—the legislature fully formalized
such precincts’ position.
3. The 1789 Act: The School Board and District Legislated.—In
1789, the newly independent state of Massachusetts updated its colonial
educational system via a new statute.184 In its school governance provisions,
this 1789 Act instituted both of the developments discussed in the
preceding Section: Boston’s development of the politically distinct school
committee, and the smaller communities’ establishment of geographically
distinct school districts. On the former front, the Act consistently listed
among the bodies responsible for a town’s schooling obligations the school
“committee.”185 Furthermore, by expanding towns’ educational duties,
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saddling their existing governments with new and complex obligations,186
the Act generated everywhere the conditions that had already pressed
Boston’s town government to create a separate school committee.187 On the
district front, the 1789 Act consistently listed not just towns, but also
“districts,” as holders of duties and powers.188 Indeed, it noted no difference
between the two entities—so much so that districts, like towns, were
authorized to subdivide themselves into districts.
While formally the state legislature in this 1789 law did not combine
the two ideas—the separate school committee and the individual school
district—towns proceeded to do so.189 Several towns created multiple
district committees.190 One even forsook for a while a town-wide school
committee, maintaining only separately elected district committees.191
Massachusetts thus exited its colonial journey with a school
governance scheme very different from the one it had when embarking on
that journey. The initial principle of reliance on local governments was
never abandoned, but the identity of the local government relied upon was
altered. The shift away from general governments—towns—was not,
despite later commentators’ claims,192 primarily the result of principled
institutional design choices. Rather, it was first and foremost generated by
the era’s special exigencies. The school committee, as a separate political
body, was the fruit of an unyielding desire among Bostonians to retain
democratic control over schools when the town’s legal regime, inspired by
Puritan ideals, offered no forum for effective democratic control. Similarly,
the school district, as a geographical subdivision, was a product of unique
patterns of Puritan settlement (i.e., the concentration of residents’ lives
around one center) and its unraveling. The need to accommodate new
realities within old ideological precepts is to be credited for the first
appearance in statute of the term “district” in the educational context, and
for the legislative recognition of a politically separate local body managing
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schools.193 In the following century this legislative recognition would
evolve into legislative decree, in Massachusetts—and elsewhere.
B.

The Ascendant School District: Nineteenth-Century Expansion

The school district was invented in colonial times, but it became
America’s default school government during the republic’s first century. At
Independence, the school district and committee were recognized as
potential forms of school governance in New England.194 By the nineteenth
century’s second half, the institution’s grip over educational matters was
absolute and its reach continental. The century thus witnessed the
culmination of two processes. First, the district and board were
consolidated as the sole body governing schools, rather than one of several
optional bodies. Second, the scheme spread beyond New England to other
areas which did not face the peculiar colonial conditions that had
engendered it. The study of these twin processes yields further insights into
the motivations for American law’s embrace of the school district.
1.

Consolidating the School District in Nineteenth-Century
Massachusetts.—Although
the
importance
of
colonial
Massachusetts to the school district’s emergence cannot be exaggerated,
the importance of the school district as an institution at that time can easily
be exaggerated. The school committees and districts of the 1789 Act were
tentative institutions. The Massachusetts law recognized them as options:
towns could create committees and could subdivide into districts. These
options accompanied, rather than replaced, the other bodies empowered to
run the schools: selectmen or town meetings.195 In other words, the school
district was a government for educational affairs in Massachusetts, but it
was not the government for educational affairs in Massachusetts. To
assume that status, the school district had to become mandatory—which it
did by the 1820s—and then had to displace all other local governments
from the field of education—which it did by the Civil War.
a. The school district made mandatory.—As seen in the
preceding Section, in 1789 the state legislature adopted a permissive
approach towards the school district. Almost immediately thereafter,
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however, it found that approach unsatisfactory, probably due to
disappointment with towns’ failings to meet schooling obligations.
Educational conditions only worsened after the 1789 law’s new mandates
were adopted. The post-revolutionary decades were years of decline for
Massachusetts’s schools.196 Post-war rebuilding struck taxpayers as more
pressing.197 The reluctance to pay for schools was exacerbated by
populations’ continued, war-induced dispersal away from centrally located
schools. Most towns thus failed to comply with state-ordered obligations to
operate schools.198
Since fault was ascribable to towns’ funding priorities, the state
legislature reacted by shifting some of the financial decisionmaking to
school districts. An 1800 act empowered “School Districts” to raise funds,
by taxation, for a school’s construction and maintenance.199 The Act gave
the town no power to block such initiatives or to access funds raised for
funding schools. This Act is exceptionally important to the school district’s
legal history. Due to a desire to assure separate and protected revenue for
schools, school district finances were, for the first time, isolated from town
finances and governments. The state legislature would formalize the school
districts’ separate standing—in all pertinent issues—in an 1817 act
announcing school districts to be separate bodies politic, empowered to sue
and be sued.200
In the following decade, the legislature did even more to entrench the
politically separate school government. In 1822, it incorporated the City of
Boston.201 Now that Boston had a separate representative government—an
elected mayor and council—the original impetus for the school
committee’s establishment disappeared. Thereupon or soon thereafter,
other colonial committees set to address specific tasks—fire, health, etc.—
would accordingly be subsumed into the new city administration.202 The
new representative city government was, after all, put in place precisely to
fill the gaps in town meeting management that these committees had
bridged before.
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In stark contrast, however, the law chartering Boston insisted that the
separate school committee be maintained.203 In 1827 that command was
expanded beyond Boston: the legislature mandated that all towns establish
a separately elected school committee.204 Furthermore, towns containing
several school districts were obliged to keep separate “prudential
committees” for each to oversee that district’s school and hire teachers.205
This 1827 law transformed the school committee from an optional
governing body into a mandatory one. The immediate reason, as seen here,
was to assure funding. The move was also permeated, however, by those
original values spawning Boston’s committee, which made the committee’s
abolition upon cityhood unthinkable: principles of citizen representation.
Commenting on the 1827 law decades later, one writer described it as
“mark[ing] the utmost limit to the subdivision of American sovereignty—
the high-water mark of modern democracy.”206
b. The school district made supreme.—For practical funding
concerns and ideological democratic commitments, the 1827 Act
institutionalized the school district we know today—a separate political
entity. One legal attribute of the modern school district was still missing
though: exclusivity. All other local governments were yet to be stripped of
their concurrent powers in the education field. This feat was accomplished
in the ensuing turbulent decades of the Jacksonian Era, when social shifts
gave rise to modern ideas about public schooling’s role, and with them, a
new idea about its governance’s desired nature.
The school scheme enacted in 1827 was applied to a state that was
very different, economically and socially, from the state the earlier 1789
Act had confronted. Manufacturing and commerce had begun their
unstoppable ascent, and cities were exploding.207 Boston’s population
almost doubled between 1800 and 1820; then, between 1820 and 1860, it
quadrupled.208 Many new residents were immigrants: by 1860, a third of the
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city’s residents were foreign.209 Newcomers were mostly poor and working
class—products of the new manufacturing-based economy.210
The city’s elite perceived this new populace as a threat, but believed it
redeemable.211 Boston’s Brahmins saw the school as a tool that could tackle
the challenge. Horace Mann, the common school’s founder, proclaimed in
1841, “the Common School is the greatest discovery ever made . . . . Other
social organizations are curative and remedial; this is a preventive and an
antidote . . . .”212 A public school system offered great promise in troubling
social times. Unfortunately, the existing system Mann and others originally
encountered in Boston could not have struck them as capable of living up
to this promise.213 The system was exceptionally disorganized. Specifically,
it was incapable of assigning students to schools or supervising
attendance,214 served only a small fraction of the population,215 and left
teachers with little guidance while instilling outdated skills.216
To fulfill their envisioned promise in exacting times, the schools had
to be fixed.217 The fix, reformers reckoned, should derive from the same
forces generating the new challenges.218 The industrial order had replaced
home-based, small manufacturing with large, planned, and hierarchical
factories. The values that had revolutionized industry should, reformers
believed, be employed to revolutionize antiquated schooling as well.219
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Planning, order, hierarchy—in one word, centralization—were seen as
imperative for public schooling’s success.220
These ideas required abandoning the haphazard way services were
provided within existing schools, and thus, for example, reformers
imported the Prussian grade system for dividing children into age-based
classes.221 But more importantly, the new organizational ideas from
manufacturing mandated revising school governance. The new factory
system propagated the conviction that better performance is achieved
through better management.222 Manufacturing prospered thanks to the
assembly-line production model. Activists set out to replicate this model
for schools, imagining the educated child as the end product.223 Assembly
lines required top-down management: the manufacturing corporation relied
on an executive board. Accordingly, the reformers concluded that to
replicate the clean efficiency of the assembly line, school management by a
compact body of professional managers was necessary.
By definition, the city’s general—and political—bodies could not
fulfill this role. They did not consist of professional managers, and were
premised on broad, open-ended, and inclusive decisionmaking.224 A
separate body was necessary. The existing school committee was such a
separate body, containing an executive board’s seeds. But only the seeds.
The contemporaneous committee’s powers and standing in relation to other
city bodies, molded to satisfy its post-Independence rationale—political
representation—was in fact the antithesis of the desired centralized
governance form.225
To accommodate the shift in separate school governance’s rationale,
the committee’s standing within the governing system had to, and did,
change. The change would generate a school committee of exclusive
powers in the educational realm.226 Since the reformers’ paramount goal
220
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was centralization, the committee’s powers were augmented and competing
power centers weakened. Gradually the committee became the
decisionmaker in all school affairs. For example, as early as 1818, the
Boston school committee insisted on appointing a primary school board
declaredly opposed to the policies of the town meeting.227 Then in 1835, a
law announced that all educational powers lay with the committee, and
removed the city’s aldermen from participating in school committee
deliberations.228 In 1837, the committee proclaimed sole discretion in
decisions respecting the assignment of students to schools.229 Finally, the
committee was empowered to appoint a professional superintendent,
emulating a corporate board appointing an expert foreman.230
At the break of the Civil War, therefore, Boston had a politically
independent body governing its schools, as it had had at the Revolution’s
conclusion.231 But that committee was dissimilar in its functioning—and
more prominently, in its animating rationale—from its earlier version.
Originally, the school committee was established as the answer to a dearth
of representative bodies. Now it was the purveyor of centralized
management. The new rationale made the committee indispensable even
after Boston had other representative bodies that could have assumed
democratic control of schools. Moreover, centralization made an
independent school board appear crucial everywhere public schooling was
introduced—irrespective of the question whether other local representative
governments existed in those places. With this new rationale propelling the
school committee, the legal institution was well-positioned to pervade an
ever-expanding nation.
2. Nationalizing the School District.—Until this point in American
legal history, the school district’s story had been a distinctly New England
affair. That began to change in the nineteenth century’s middle decades.
During those decades, the school district, already well ensconced in New
England thanks to developments just reviewed, spread throughout the
nation. Previously, other states had not recognized school committees or
districts. But neither did they recognize public schools.232 Throughout the
227
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century, the two progressed hand in hand across the states: wherever public
education was introduced, a separate body to govern schools emerged.233
But the universal nature of this end result obscures its diverse roots. The
following review of the processes through which the school district scheme
was instituted in different states reveals, in order, four distinct motivations
for its adoption: imitation, lack of other local governments, political needs
for community-level decisionmaking, and funding necessities.
The first, and inarguably decisive, reason for the school district’s
spread during the nineteenth century was emulation. Although the body
was originally created due to the special, and parochial, circumstances of
colonial Puritan New England, by the nineteenth century the district was a
decades-, if not centuries-old characteristic of the country’s first public
schooling system.234 Lawmakers thus viewed the school district as essential
for an education system.
This attitude clearly reigned in the first non-New England states to
establish public education. New York and Ohio were both heavily settled
by New Englanders, whose advocacy led to the enactment in those states,
in 1812 and 1824, respectively, of school laws replicating Massachusetts’s
1789 Act.235 The pattern was similar in Midwestern states admitted to the
Union later, even those with a less marked presence of New Englander
settlers.236 The Michigan Supreme Court, for example, explicitly identified
the state’s 1827 public education law as modeled after Massachusetts’s,
and thus read it as aiming to emulate the New England-style school district
system.237
Michigan was also impacted by the second reason responsible for the
nineteenth-century spread of the school district system: new states’ origins
233
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as federal territories. The federal Northwest Ordinance, establishing a legal
framework for the Union’s first organized territories—the Northwest
Territory, which included future Michigan—provided that schools “shall
forever be encouraged” in those lands.238 Stirred by this high-minded
ideal—and by somewhat less high-minded pecuniary considerations—the
United States offered to grant Ohio, the first state admitted from the
Territory, free land for school purposes in every township in exchange for
Ohio’s agreement not to tax federal lands for five years after their sale
(thereby rendering those lands more appealing to the federal government’s
buyers).239 Ohio assented,240 as did all subsequent states carved from federal
territories.241
The grants presented the new states with a governance challenge. All
townships were now in possession of land to fund schools. The land
required management: it had to be farmed or leased. At a minimum, waste
had to be prevented. Yet the townships had no schools—or local
governments—to assume that management task. The solution was to
import the school committee—even before a school existed or was planned.
Territories enacted laws empowering settlers to elect school commissioners
to manage school lands.242 This process was reminiscent of the template set
back in colonial Boston: the body governing schools emerged since other
government bodies were absent. Yet the process’s fortuity was even more
pronounced in the new territories and states. Boston needed a body to
govern schools since it had schools and was dedicated to schooling; in the
territories, the governance body was created without schools to govern and
with little concern for schooling.
This wavering support for education ironically generated a third cause
for the attachment to the school district in the nineteenth century: a desire
to enable community decisionmaking. As seen in Section II.A.1, in Puritan
New England, statutes forced communities to provide free education.
Elsewhere, where the population was more religiously diverse, compulsion
was not politically viable.243 Some communities—often, those with New
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England roots—desired public schooling; others did not.244 The sole way
for legislatures to appease all communities was to enable each to chart its
own course,245 an approach particularly appropriate in an era infused with
Jacksonian ideas of popular self-determination.246 This goal could be
achieved by separating school governance from general governments. Early
school acts authorized, but did not force, residents to form a school
committee.247 Thereby, distinct communities, even when subject to the
same general government—i.e., county or township—could differ in their
approach to education.248 Each community within the county or township
could create its own public schooling system—or choose to refrain from
creating one.
The school district was the smallest, and most voluntary, unit of selfgovernment in the political system. Since the district was thus not required
to geographically overlap with a general government, it could break down
existing political boundaries. The average Midwestern township contained
nine school districts.249 The school district similarly accommodated
communities straddling political boundaries: parents could form a district
across township and county lines.250 The scheme was also employed within
cities, for example, Chicago and Pittsburgh,251 to likewise empower
individual neighborhoods to decide whether to sustain schools.252 It then
allowed neighbors to pick teachers reflecting neighborhood ethnicities.253 In
244
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the cities as in the countryside, the district system emerged, therefore, as a
powerful tool for small-scale communities to design their own public
institutions and services and to manage their affairs.
The fourth and final factor rendering the district scheme appealing in
the nineteenth century was also grounded in certain communities’ demands
for education: the school district plan could furnish such communities with
funding for education. In the nineteenth century’s swelling cities, the
original funds allocated for schooling quickly grew unsatisfactory,254 and
parents were saddled with fees.255 Reformers thus campaigned—
successfully—for statutes establishing school boards, separate from major
cities’ general governments, with independent powers to finance schools
and compel the raising of funds.256
The school district further promoted such financing goals once, later
in the century, commitment to education hardened and states began
mandating schooling. Legislatures created school boards and tasked them
with raising funds for schooling—thereby bypassing the era’s languid
general governments that ran miniscule budgets and hardly raised taxes.257
This legislative practice was challenged—but courts approved it, and in the
process explicated the school district’s normative grounding.258 A Utah case
is illustrative. The plaintiff rail company was taxed by a newly minted
school district.259 The company’s property was separated from the actual
school by twenty-five miles of mountainous land impassable in winter.260
Yet the territorial court found immaterial the company’s inability to enjoy
the school. Education, the court reasoned, was not merely a “local” or
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private concern of its consumers.261 It was a public concern, and thus
establishing a special government to fund it irrespective of the local general
government’s desires was justified—and necessary.262
The legal commitment to education was finally, and unquestionably,
established. So was, by this point, the commitment to the school district.
Different states might have used distinct, and circuitous, routes to get to the
school district, but by the century’s second half they all had arrived there.263
A spate of court decisions in the 1870s and 1880s removed any doubt as to
the institution’s preeminence. Courts brusquely rejected challenges to the
system, stating in unambiguous terms that schooling was to be provided by
separate governments.
In 1872, the Supreme Court of Ohio explained that the “management
and control” of schools has been placed “exclusively in the hands of
directors, trustees, or boards of education.”264 Two years later the Supreme
Court of Michigan announced: “by law the [school] board had [full control]
over the schools of the district.”265 The court would “spend no time”
considering a challenge to the school board’s authority.266 The Supreme
Court of Louisiana resorted to even more forceful terms: “there can be no
doubt that . . . the city board of school directors . . . shall have sole and
exclusive control and regulation of the public schools within the city as
against the apprehended antagonistic authority over the subject that might
be set up by the City Council.”267 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Kansas
clarified that “the board of education of the city of Topeka is a distinct
corporation from the municipal corporation of the city of Topeka.”268
Therefore, the city lacked authority to interfere with the board’s powers
over education: “The fact that [the Board’s] limits or boundaries are the
same as that of the city of Topeka, makes no difference.”269 The Supreme
261
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Court of North Carolina held that the general government—the county—
could not change school districts’ boundaries.270 The Supreme Court of
North Dakota ruled that the district’s bonds were separate from the
township’s unless a specific statute provided otherwise,271 and courts in
Tennessee and Maryland decided that so were the school district’s tax
funds.272 Under similar reasoning, the Supreme Court of Indiana refused to
read a city tax exemption as extending to school district taxes.273 A West
Virginia court summarized by characterizing the township and school
district as “distinct and independent corporations.”274
As these court decisions demonstrate, by the nineteenth century’s final
quarter, the school district’s status in American law, as a politically
separate entity with secure governing powers, was unassailable. The district
had been elevated to that position by several factors that were unearthed in
this Section. Many of these reasons can be written off as happenstance.
First and foremost, public schools’ founders, observing their New England
predecessors, simply assumed that only a separate government could
control public schooling. Additionally, some states turned to the district
system because they were in need of a body (any body) to govern a
resource (federal land grants for schools) when no local governing body
existed. Even the substantive goals the school district was set to advance
were mostly reactions to contemporary exigencies: a political reality
demanding community-option-respecting schooling and a funding vacuum
necessitating a separate revenue stream.
These reasons all account for the school district’s proliferation. They
cannot, however, explain its persistence. How did this legal institution
survive the disappearance of the serendipitous conditions to which it owed
its ascent? Immediately upon the school district’s continental consolidation,
as just described, conditions in America changed dramatically. Thus, our
quandary respecting the school district’s endurance can only be fully
answered through an exploration of that next chapter of the school district’s
legal history—during which the original stimuli for its appearance receded.
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The Established School District: Progressive Era Reforms

The school district, born in colonial times, became an inveterate
American government body in the century following Independence. During
those decades, as the school district was expanding in legal stature and
geographical reach, an alternative system of school administration was
never even suggested. Thanks to the school district’s esteemed colonial
provenance coupled with the Mann movement’s centralization credo, an
unshakeable faith in its indispensability prevailed, as the preceding Section
highlighted.275
But the turn of the twentieth century was a period for unsettling most
such unshakeable faiths and questioning seemingly indispensable
government bodies. Confronted with unprecedented economic,
technological, and demographic changes wrought by mass industrialization,
thinkers, activists, and lawmakers—in what would eventually be christened
the Progressive Era—found many old principles and institutions
outdated.276 Reformers poured special scorn upon nineteenth-century
governments—which they disparaged as ill-equipped and too corrupt to
rise to the new century’s challenges.277 Thus began a reconsideration of
government’s role in American life that fostered reforms on all government
levels.278 The school district, as a government created in response to bygone
eras’ peculiar demands, appeared especially ripe for such reconsideration.279
Accordingly, during the Progressive Era, schemes for the school
district’s overhaul and even replacement were contemplated for the first
time in American history. Progressives introduced expertise as the value to
which all institutions must adhere, and they fiercely assailed the school
district—and its traditional rationales—for its incompatibility with that
value. Yet all the era’s turmoil would eventually leave the school district
unscathed; indeed, it would leave it vindicated. Progressives ended up
viewing the school district not as expertise’s enemy, but as its
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embodiment—and thus as superior to other local governments. To fully
depict the transformation, this Section will first review the challenge posed
to the legal institution of the school district by the new value of expertise,
and then turn to its wedding to that value—a reimagination process that
produced the current, impregnable school district described in Part I.
1. Expertise-Driven Assault on the School District.—Progressive Era
reforms were reactions to changing American realities.280 They were also,
however, products of changes in scientific thinking, particularly in the
social sciences. The social sciences were creatures of the late nineteenth
century.281 Economics, sociology, psychology, and the political sciences
were the hallmarks of the new research university.282 Another academic
field introduced at the time was education: Universities opened the firstever education departments.283 In education, as in all research fields,
contemporary academics’ ambitions expanded beyond scholarly
advancement.284 The era’s academics believed that through academic
exploration, solutions could be devised to the problems besetting their
society.285 Specifically, they were persuaded that furnished with empirical
data and informed analysis, government could effectively deal with
industrialization’s challenges.286
A natural target for such efforts at social bettering through expert
governing was the local arena.287 Cities were the industrial upheaval’s
locus: encumbered with unregulated manufacturers, unprecedented density,
and devastating poverty.288 Moreover, reformers could easily attribute
280
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287
JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 642 (1919) (“There is no denying that the
government of cities is the one conspicuous failure of the United States.”).
288
See generally JACOB A. RIIS, HOW THE OTHER HALF LIVES: STUDIES AMONG THE TENEMENTS
OF NEW YORK (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons 1890) (famously portraying residents’ plight).
281
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cities’ failures in tackling these trials to incompetent governance.289 They
portrayed local governments as inept and corrupt290 and set out to substitute
existing structures with expertise-driven replacements.291
Progressive Era reformers’ battle, under the banner of expert
government, against local “machine politics” prompted drastic changes in
American local government law. As others have chronicled, key attributes
of current law—home rule,292 the ban on special legislation,293 city
managers,294 zoning,295 and the special district296—date to those efforts. But
the reformers’ efforts also profoundly affected education’s governance.297
Dedicated to science, social work, and knowledge’s redeeming virtues,
progressives emphasized education as a crucial component of their agenda
for saving the poor, and the nation.298 This celebration of education,
combined with the abhorrence of machine politics, led reformers to
intensely campaign to divorce education’s management from politics.299
The goal, one writer explained, must be “placing the schools beyond the
reach of the politicians.”300
289

E.g., LINCOLN STEFFENS, THE SHAME OF THE CITIES 3–18 (1904) (portraying the struggle as
between “good government” reformers and “commercial politician[s]”).
290
See, e.g., LINCOLN STEFFENS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LINCOLN STEFFENS 422 (1931)
(“Philadelphia, Corrupt and Contented, . . . [was not the] worst in the land . . . . It was only older than
St. Louis and Minneapolis.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
291
Samuel P. Hays, The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era,
55 PAC. NW. Q. 157, 160 (1964).
292
See generally David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2257 (2003)
(describing the Progressive Era efforts to both grant and limit the authorities of local governments in
order to enable cities to bring about urban reform).
293
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1990).
294
See generally HARRY AUBREY TOULMIN, JR., THE CITY MANAGER: A NEW PROFESSION 156–
68 (1915) (describing the rise of and response to the city manager plan as a method of municipal
reform).
295
See generally Nadav Shoked, The Reinvention of Ownership: The Embrace of Residential
Zoning and the Modern Populist Reading of Property, 28 YALE J. REG. 91 (2011) (describing the legal
adoption of zoning laws at the time).
296
See generally Shoked, supra note 22, at 1986–87 (describing how progressive New Dealers
embraced and promoted the special district).
297
Schools had their own muckraker. See generally JOSEPH M. RICE, THE PUBLIC-SCHOOL SYSTEM
OF THE UNITED STATES (New York, The Century Co. 1893).
298
CUBBERLEY, supra note 115, at 763–64 (“Education in a democratic government such as ours is
the greatest of all undertakings for the promotion of the national welfare.”); see also LAWRENCE A.
CREMIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 6–7 (1965) (highlighting progressives’ determination
that education was the task of schools—not home or society).
299
JOHN D. PHILBRICK, U.S. BUREAU OF EDUC., CIRCULARS OF INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU OF
EDUCATION, NO. 1-1885: CITY SCHOOL SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (1885) (“[A]s is your
school board, so are your schools.”).
300
Orth, supra note 279, at 416.
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Initially, this goal entailed undermining the school district.301 The New
York Times announced “the best method of proceeding to reform the
schools . . . is by reforming the whole system of their management.”302 To
reformers’ dismay, the school district had remained throughout its
existence an elected, political body.303 Even worse—from the prejudiced
perspective of these genteel activists—the identity of those elected to serve
on district boards was changing. Mass immigration had transformed the
franchise—and the candidates chosen for office.304 Reformers characterized
board members as at best amateurs,305 and at worst corrupt political hacks
utilizing the office for patronage or as political stepping stone.306 Such
inferior officials had to be replaced by experts running the schools to
everyone’s benefit.307
Calls were made to weaken the school board by transferring more
powers to an appointed expert school superintendent.308 These calls were
sometimes intensified to pleas for the board’s outright abolition.309
Commentators noted that other specialized city boards were
disappearing.310 Some thus envisioned the school board’s duties assumed
by a professional school department within city government.311 Combining
these two lines of thinking, one major professional organization proposed a
legislative education board appointed by the city mayor contenting itself

301

See TYACK & HANSOT, supra note 236, at 204 (noting that liberal reformers “believed in
granting greater power and autonomy to professional educators”).
302
Wanted—Money and Brains, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1895, at 4.
303
DAVID B. TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN URBAN EDUCATION 130
(1974) (quoting reformers who explained that the “strong . . . honest and experienced men” needed for
the government of schools cannot be secured through “unrestricted suffrage”); see also Wiebe, supra
note 252, at 152 (noting that teachers were playing a subordinate role in education).
304
E.g., Orth, supra note 279, at 406–07 (describing how “foreign influx” into Cleveland changed
the city’s “political complexion,” including school administration).
305
See, e.g., PHILBRICK, supra note 299, at 52, 55 (arguing that school boards are behind the times,
incompetent, or indifferent to the public interest).
306
CRONIN, supra note 230, at 64–68.
307
TYACK & HANSOT, supra note 236, at 107.
308
E.g., RICE, supra note 297, at 18–19 (suggesting that school boards should appoint
superintendents with sufficient independent power); William H. Maxwell, Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, Report of
Committee of Fifteen, 1895 J. PROC. & ADDRESSES, at 232, 234 (listing as issues for discussion the
responsibilities, authorities, and qualifications of superintendents).
309
Charles H. Judd, Abolish the School Boards, 15 PUB. MGMT. 321, 321 (1933).
310
See, e.g., 1 CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON SCHOOL INQUIRY, BOARD OF
ESTIMATE AND APPORTIONMENT 55 (1913) (noting that “[t]he large unwieldy school board is being
abandoned”).
311
Charles H. Judd, School Boards as an Obstruction to Good Administration, 13 NATION’S SCHS.
13, 14–15 (1934).
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with general policy, leaving decisionmaking to a professional
superintendent.312
These proposals conveyed a clear message: the politicized school
district should lose its primacy in the education field.313 It ought to be
replaced by a professional agent or body within the city’s bureaucracy.
Several major cities heeded that message. Most prominently, in 1920, San
Francisco voters substituted their school board with one appointed by the
mayor.314 Earlier, in 1905, Houston had already adopted such an appointed
board.315 As a legal institution, the politically independent district was
slumping. But not for long.
2. Expertise-Driven Embrace of the School District.—The
progressive attack on the school district stands out not only for its
fierceness, but also for its brevity. Experiments with educational systems
not centered on a politically independent school district were outliers.316
San Francisco’s move emanated from very peculiar, and parochial, political
circumstances,317 and even there, residents were, immediately after the
appointed-board plan was adopted, afforded the right to ratify mayoral
appointees to the board.318 Houston’s spell as an outlier was short-lived: in
1923 it reverted to an elected board.319 Elsewhere, reformers’ stated
hostility towards the existing school district scheme did not translate into
actual moves to rein in separately elected boards. St. Louis rejected all such
proposals.320 Buffalo, in the midst of an effort to modernize its school
system, was urged by authorities on school administration to adopt an
elected board.321 In New York City and Chicago, mayoral involvement with
school boards was scathingly criticized.322

312

Andrew S. Draper, Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, Report of the Sub-Committee on the Organization of City
School Systems, 1895 J. PROC. & ADDRESSES, at 375, 375–88.
313
More radical calls demanded that the state replace it. CUBBERLEY, supra note 115, at 746.
314
Victor L. Shradar, Ethnicity, Religion and Class: Progressive School Reform in San Francisco,
20 HIST. EDUC. Q. 385, 388–89, 485 (1980).
315
CRONIN, supra note 230, at 96–97.
316
See Orth, supra note 279 (failing to produce examples).
317
Shradar, supra note 314, at 398–99 (showing that the vote to abolish the elected board did not
trace the usual elite versus working class lines, but rather the local elite were successful since the city’s
conditions enabled them to form an alliance with the local native-born working classes in opposition to
the Catholic working class).
318
CRONIN, supra note 230, at 131–32.
319
Id. at 132.
320
Id. at 73.
321
See BUFFALO MUN. RESEARCH BUREAU, REPORT OF THE BUFFALO SCHOOL SURVEY 22–23
(1931).
322
CRONIN, supra note 230, at 133.
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Reformers were not blind to this poor track record. As early as the
1930s, commentators were noting the scant headway made by proposals for
merging school governments with other, general governments.323 The truth
was, however, that almost from the outset, reformers’ own opposition to
the politically separate school district dithered.324 The reason was simple:
the school district may not have been reformers’ ideal expertise-driven
body for managing schools, but the alternative was even less palatable.
General governments were progressives’ bêtes noires. “[T]he city
governments of the United States,” one wrote, “are the worst in
Christendom.”325 Thus it was not surprising that most reformers balked at
suggestions that city governments control schools.326 A typical critique of
these initiatives reiterated reformers’ mantra “that education [was] too
‘important’ to be a municipal function.”327 Progressives were advocating
expertise-driven decisionmaking: their concern, unlike that of earlier
Mann-era reformers, was not simply centralization.328 City government was
local government’s hub, but it was also the nub of political activity, and
thus constitutively impervious to expertise-driven decisionmaking.329
Reformers had for decades focused their efforts on removing powers from
the city’s purview. The notion that responsibilities should be added to the
city’s portfolio was anathema.330
Reformers’ original misgivings gave way: politically independent
school districts’ merits were reconsidered.331 The school district was similar
323

See NELSON B. HENRY, SCHOOLS AND CITY GOVERNMENT 2 (1938) (describing how citizens
were fearful of a “dependent” school system due to the risk of political abuses, such as the misuse of
school funds).
324
TYACK, supra note 303, at 145–47 (explaining that despite their strong endorsement of
administrative control of schools by an expert superintendent, reformers still entertained the endurance
of the school board as a buffer between the experts and the politicians); see also RAYMOND E.
CALLAHAN, EDUCATION AND THE CULT OF EFFICIENCY 193–96 (1962) (describing debates among
reformers about the need for local control over the expert administrator they imagined running the
schools).
325
Andrew D. White, The Government of American Cities, FORUM (1890), reprinted in URBAN
GOVERNMENT 213 (Banfield ed., 1961).
326
CUBBERLEY, supra note 251, at 96, 104; GEORGE D. STRAYER, EDUC. POLICIES COMM’N, THE
STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION OF EDUCATION IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 59 (1938).
327
CRONIN, supra note 230, at 140 (citation omitted).
328
See Charles Francis Adams, Jr., The Development of the Superintendency, 1880 ADDRESSES &
J. PROC. NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, at 61, 64–65 (assailing Mann reformers as “pseudo-intellectual[s],”
obsessed with mindless organization rather than academic expertise).
329
See TYACK & HANSOT, supra note 236, at 108 (contrasting political issues decided by elected
representatives on central committees with “matters of administrative discretion” decided by experts).
330
See CRONIN, supra note 230, at 139–43 (describing the controversy surrounding one scholar’s
campaign to abolish school boards).
331
TYACK & HANSOT, supra note 236, at 108. Isolated commentators agitated again for board
abolition during the Depression to save money. CRONIN, supra note 230, at 138.
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to the special district—a legal institution whose status and similarities to
the school district were introduced in Section I.B. Reformers were
enamored with the special district, a supposedly specialized entity that
drained powers (over housing, water, etc.) from the loathed political city.332
Like the special district, the school district removed powers over the
provision of a service (in this case, education) from city hall. The school
district could thus appeal to reformers.333
But the school district did not truly replicate the cherished model of
the special district: true, it removed powers from city hall, but it did not
place those powers beyond the reach of politics. Unlike most special
districts, the school district was always elected by the general public—
therefore it was inevitably placed at the midst of the political thicket. To
serve the new expertise rationale the existing school district thus had to be
reshaped.334 Several legal moves were accordingly pursued by reformers,
forming an “organizational revolution” transforming the school district.335
The revolution’s overarching concern was depoliticizing the school
district.336 New York’s highest court explained: “If there be one public
policy well-established in this State it is that public education shall be
beyond control by municipalities and politics.”337 The general strategy was
to turn the school district into a broader administrative unit, rendering it
less “parochial.”338 Thus power was consolidated in the city’s school board
as ward (i.e., neighborhood) boards set to manage individual schools were
abolished.339 Next, often prodded by state legislatures, school boards
switched from ward-based representation to at-large elections,340 allegedly
producing members not beholden to narrow constituencies, but to the
people’s general interest.341 Boards were also reduced in size to improve
members’ quality.342 And in the most celebrated reform, Cleveland attacked

332

Shoked, supra note 22, at 1986–87.
Orth, supra note 279, at 408.
334
Id. at 403.
335
TYACK, supra note 303. See generally WILLIAM A. BULLOUGH, CITIES AND SCHOOLS IN THE
GILDED AGE (1974).
336
Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, Secretary’s Minutes, Department of Superintendance, 1892 J. PROC. &
ADDRESSES, at 561, 568.
337
Divisich v. Marshall, 22 N.E.2d 327, 328 (N.Y. 1939).
338
CUBBERLEY, supra note 115, at 746.
339
RAVITCH, supra note 45, at 155.
340
E.g., CRONIN, supra note 230, at 50 (discussing the rise and fall of ward representation in
Buffalo, Chicago, and Boston, among other cities).
341
TOULMIN, supra note 294, at 42.
342
CUBBERLEY, supra note 251, at 92 (explaining that large boards prioritized political
grandstanding).
333
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the authority of politically accountable school board members.343 It
removed powers from board members, transferring those powers to an
executive elected directly.344 The voters were not free to elect whomever
they fancied, however, for that post; the statute required the executive to
deposit an exceptionally steep bond,345 thereby assuring that he be among
the city’s business elite, and “practically eliminat[ing]” politics from the
schools.346 Pittsburgh went a step further: there, starting in 1911, judges
appointed school board members.347
These radical two plans, as well as the more restrained (and common)
reforms toward consolidation of major cities’ boards, aimed to render the
school district a conduit for expertise—rather than political expression.
This transformation in the school district’s normative purpose was perhaps
even more pronounced in reforms pursued outside cities. Originally, as
explained in Section II.B.2, rural school districts were created as county
and township subareas wherever a group of residents desired a school.
Thus in many states, the countryside was littered with hundreds, if not
thousands, of miniscule districts, each controlling just one school.348 The
small, one-room ungraded schools these districts ran struck reformers as
inadequate for the new century’s demands.349 These school districts’
scheme of governance also starkly contradicted reformers’ preference for
larger units promoting professionalization, sound school finances,350 and
the “entire elimination of politics” that otherwise dominated small,
community-controlled governments.351
Thus began the drive to consolidate rural school districts.352 Some
states allowed school districts to initiate the process themselves,353
343

Andrew S. Draper, Plans of Organization for School Purposes in Large Cities, 1894 NAT’L
EDUC. ASS’N J. PROCEEDINGS & ADDRESSES, at 298, 307 (“[The Cleveland Plan] is radical in its
innovations. There is nothing else like it in the country. It came from the best and most substantial
thought of a great city, which has deep interest in its public schools . . . . It is in the direction of, if it
does not go beyond, what has been advised by the best educational thought of the country.”).
344
Orth, supra note 279, at 415.
345
Bond was set at $25,000, while the annual salary was $5,000. Id.
346
Id.
347
Act of May 18, 1911, art. II, §§ 201–02, 206, 1911 Pa. Laws 309, 317–18.
348
Fischel, supra note 45, at 177.
349
MABEL CARNEY, COUNTRY LIFE AND THE COUNTRY SCHOOL 140–42 (1912). The Commission
on Country Life appointed by President Roosevelt in 1908 singled out the one-room school as holding
rural areas back. COUNTRY LIFE COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON COUNTRY LIFE 26–27
(Sturgis & Walton eds., 1917).
350
FULLER, supra note 249, at 232.
351
CUBBERLEY, supra note 115, at 721.
352
JONATHAN SHER, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN SPARSELY POPULATED AREAS OF THE UNITED STATES
28–29 (1977).
353
Act of Mar. 11, 1901, ch. CC, § 1, 1901 Ind. Acts 437, 437.
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sometimes enticing them with subsidies.354 Other states empowered county
officials to unilaterally change subcounty school districts’ boundaries.355
Still other states mandated the process: formally abolishing the district
system,356 or proclaiming each county one school district.357 By the early
1900s, all New England states had largely consolidated school districts
along township lines—achieving almost perfect geographical overlap
between the school district and the general government.358 Tellingly, in
1901, the educational system adopted for recently colonized Puerto Rico
consisted of elected boards governing school districts geographically
conterminous with existing municipalities.359
But in many places, particularly in the Midwest, the consolidation
campaign stalled360 —resulting in the lack of geographical overlap between
school districts and general governments still prevalent today, as described
in Part I. Local communities fought back against expert-driven
centralization,361 and statutory reforms were often rescinded within a few
years.362 Reformers would not relent, however. The eventual compromise
carried portentous results for American law. Consolidation was to continue,
but control was ceded to local residents. Local residents were empowered
to create consolidated school districts as they desired.363 Districts were thus
to follow lines residents deemed “organic” or corresponding to “natural
community” boundaries, rather than to general government lines. The
outcome was enlarged districts—geared towards the new value of
expertise—but whose boundaries diverged from other governments’
boundaries—justified by an appeal to community values, reminiscent of the

354

Central Rural Schools Act, ch. 55, art. 6-B, 1914 N.Y. Laws 278, amended by Act of Apr. 16,
1925, ch. 673, § 185, 1925 N.Y. Laws 1118, 1118–19.
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Act of Mar. 9, 1907, ch. 329, § 1, 1907 Kan. Sess. Laws 500, 500.
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1890 N.D. Laws Chap. 62, sec. 35, in LAWS PASSED AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA 183 (1890) (mandating that all townships
not organized into districts during the territorial period will constitute “school corporation[s]”).
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Act of Aug. 19, 1919, art. VIII, sec. V, § 76, 1919 Ga. Laws 288, 320.
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HAL S. BARRON, MIXED HARVEST 49–56 (1997).
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Act of Jan. 31, 1901, § 13, 1900 P.R. Laws 29, 33.
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BARRON, supra note 358, at 75.
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E.g., LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, DEFENDER OF THE FAITH 289 (1987) (“A scientific soviet . . . is
attempting to dictate what shall be taught in our schools . . . .” (quoting William Jennings Bryan)).
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E.g., Julian E. Butterworth, The Evolution of Rural School Organization in New York, in YOUR
SCHOOL DISTRICT 193, 195 (Howard A. Dawson & Floyd W. Reeves eds., 1948) (describing the repeal
of New York’s 1917 law).
363
Howard A. Dawson & Floyd W. Reeves, Foreward, in YOUR SCHOOL DISTRICT, supra note
362, at 13.
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representation and small-scale community decisionmaking values propping
up the district earlier during the nineteenth century.364
This concession to older values should not, however, conceal the
break with the past the progressive reforms managed to accomplish—in the
countryside as in the cities. In earlier periods, the core of the school
district’s normative appeal was its closeness to the people. The school
district’s new expertise-laden justification abhorred that closeness and the
populist urges it exuded.365 The pioneering social worker Jane Addams
described the battle over the Chicago school board’s structure as “an
epitome of the struggle between efficiency and democracy.”366 For many
reformers, choosing sides was easy: they “believed less in the people and
more in the possibility of philosopher-kings.”367 Reformers were blunt in
their denial of democratic precepts: to increase “efficiency” schools should
“give up the exceedingly democratic idea that all are equal, and that our
society is devoid of classes.”368
Thus the import of the Progressive Era’s legal reforms should not be
downplayed. The reforms themselves may in hindsight appear technical—a
reduction in the number of school board members and of districts, the
transfer of powers to executives, and the establishment of a nonneighborhood-based representation scheme. But through these adjustments,
the school district’s normative role was transformed.369 To the extent
possible, the board was distanced from the people: Democracy was
contained.370 The ease of this transformation was extraordinary. It
demonstrated the school district’s normative malleability—and durability.
Through technical reforms those who had been committed to the school
district’s annihilation in the name of expertise became the district’s leading
champions—in the name of expertise. The fiercest and most-principled
364

MARTIN, supra note 151, at 206 (detailing consolidation opponents’ claims).
TYACK & HANSOT, supra note 253, at 107.
366
JANE ADDAMS, TWENTY YEARS AT HULL HOUSE 335 (12th prtg. 1962).
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CRONIN, supra note 230, at 118.
368
ELLWOOD P. CUBBERLEY, CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF EDUCATION 56–57 (1909); see also
Andrew Sloane Draper, Education Organization and Administration, in EDUCATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 9–10 (Nicholas Murray Butler ed., 1900) (asserting that the more centralized township system
has produced “better schools and schools of more uniform excellence” compared to the district system).
369
Douglas E. Mitchell, Major Efforts to Improve School Performance, in SHAPING EDUCATION
POLICY, supra note 109, at 213 (“The Progressive . . . [r]eform movement [was] largely successful in
separating educational governance systems from those responsible for the rest of local civic policies.”).
370
See CHARLES DERBER ET AL., POWER IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE: PROFESSIONALS AND THE RISE
OF A NEW MANDARIN ORDER 87–89 (1990) (reviewing the claim that in the new industrial order
education became a front of class warfare); Wiebe, supra note 252, at 159 (“The modern system,
despite the democratic claims of its defenders, more obviously served one class of citizens than had its
predecessor.”).
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attack on the school district’s separate legal standing mounted until that
point—or, as the ensuing century would prove, after that point—was not
only repelled, but converted into a crusade on the school district’s behalf.
D.

Summary: The Normative Values Sustaining the School District

The school governance scheme which emerged from the Progressive
Era—a politically separate government whose limited-sized board manages
all schools located within geographic boundaries that may not correspond
to those of a general government—is wholly recognizable. It is the one
presented in Part I as currently characterizing American law, and thus here
concludes this Part’s historical story of the manner in which the American
school district surfaced. An answer can now be synthesized for the question
driving the effort: Why did American law develop this separate local body
to govern education?
First and foremost, the answer is that at relevant times no local
governing entities existed that could assume that chore. Colonial New
England towns had to operate schools on a daily basis but had no ongoing
governments. Later, townships in the territories and nascent states to the
west had to manage lands granted for school purposes, but, still in early
development stages, had no governing entities whatsoever. Path
dependence similarly played a role. Since the first communities to
introduce public education—the colonial New England towns—governed it
through districts, later adopters perceived school districts as requisite.
Nonetheless, some informed institutional design principles were
apparent at times—even if they were mostly used to sustain the school
district after it had already appeared. The district was fortified as a bulwark
of democratic representation in post-Independence New England.
Relatedly, it was embraced starting in the Jacksonian Era as a tool for
facilitating self-determination by small-scale communities—a task it had
also performed earlier in rural Massachusetts. Conversely, the separate
school district was sometimes urged through a denial of these democratic
and communitarian values: as proffering centralization (for Mann era
reformers) and expertise-driven management (for Progressive Era
reformers). Finally, a politically separate government for schools was at
times (e.g., post-Independence Massachusetts, the nineteenth century’s
second half) promoted since it could fence off funding for schools.
For all these diverse reasons—some based on convenience, others on
normative calculation—American law created and molded the school
district from the mid-seventeenth century through the mid-twentieth
century. These reasons do not, however, necessarily justify its retention
today. Can the school district still serve its goals, given the economic,
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political, social, and legal realities of the postwar era? That inquiry
animates the Article’s next Part.
III.

THE TOLL OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT

The school district, a legal institution created in the colonies, forged
on the frontier, and ripened in the Progressive Era, now operates in the
environment of the twenty-first century. An important contrast between
current and earlier settings is that now all states recognize general purpose
local governments that could potentially manage schools: cities and
counties. Thus, the original and principal justification for the school
district’s establishment and empowerment—the absence of a local
alternative—is obsolete.
The school district is justifiable today only if it outperforms that nowexisting alternative: the general government, especially since in American
law that government is the default government for other local services.
Earlier Progressive Era reformers, struggling with the same question
respecting the school district’s relative merits, eventually deemed it
superior to the general government. Roughly a century later, that
conclusion does not necessarily hold.
Furthermore, an updated comparison of the qualities of the school
district and those of alternative governments need not be conducted in light
of only one normative metric, the sole value those reformers cherished—
expertise. Rather, the assessment ought to be eclectic and agnostic: Does
the school district still serve any of the substantive values ascribed to it
better than general governments?
This Part will thus revisit each of the justifications employed in the
past to establish, or sustain, the school district, to see if any hold water in
2017. These justifications, as Part II discerned, included democratic
participation, small-scale community building, efficient school
management through expertise, and stable school funding. The focus on
these values is prompted by the school district’s history, but it is warranted
regardless. For these values run the full gamut of the benefits
commentators typically associate with local government, which count
popular participation, efficient provision of public services, and community
building.371
Therefore, as this Part’s review will show, in and of itself each of the
four values to which appeals were made in the past to justify the school
district still hold much normative allure today. However, as the separate
treatment of each of these normative values will also reveal, the school
371
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district can no longer nurture any of them better than the general
government. Modern social, economic, political, and legal changes have
hampered the institution’s ability to serve the worthwhile values that had
vindicated it. Some of these values are even, in all likelihood, disserved by
the school district today.
A.

The Modern School District and Democratic Participation

Since its original induction into state law, in post-Independence
Massachusetts, the school district has repeatedly been justified as a vehicle
for citizen representation.372 Even those, like Progressive Era reformers,
who dismissed the value of popular representation in school management,
recognized the school district’s contribution to democratizing education.373
An elected school board could empower citizens to express their
preferences respecting schooling as voters and as candidates for office. Still
today, this rationale is often cited by commentators and courts extolling the
school district.374
This endorsement remains feasible now, even in the presence of
general governments also composed of elected leadership bodies, because
the school district enjoys a built-in democratic advantage over those
governments. When voting in general elections for mayoral or council
candidates, a resident picks among bundled products: each candidate offers
a menu of positions on varied issues.375 The resident must vote for one
candidate, though no candidate can perfectly reflect all her preferences
across the many diverse fields of local policy.376 The resident therefore
compromises and settles for a candidate that—while agreeable to her on
some issues (say, policing and taxation)—does not match all her
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See supra notes 157–60, 206 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 334–47 and accompanying text.
374
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49 (1973); Wright v. Council of
Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 469 (1972); RONALD W. REBORE, SR., A HANDBOOK FOR SCHOOL BOARD
MEMBERS 5 (1984) (“School districts are perhaps the most democratically controlled agency of
government.”); CHARLES EVERAND REEVES, SCHOOL BOARDS 10 (1954) (describing boards as
“[b]ulwarks of [d]emocracy”); Wong & Farris, supra note 109, at 217 (“An independent local school
district that is free from general government control is consistent with the American ethos. An
autonomous school system reflects strongly held public beliefs in democratic, nonpartisan control over
public education.”).
375
See ROBERT S. AMDURSKY ET AL., MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW 312–13 (2d ed. 2013)
(describing how voters are “restricted to voting for or against a candidate based on their overall
performance, rather than expressing their approval or disapproval of discrete decisions”); Saikrishna
Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1546–47 (2005)
(explaining that elections are an inexact means to discern voter preferences).
376
Clayton P. Gillette, Direct Democracy and Debt, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 365, 372
(2004).
373
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preferences (say, respecting zoning). When, conversely, the resident votes
for an official whose responsibilities, and thus platform, are confined to one
issue—e.g., education for the school board member—she need not
compromise. The candidate she picks, by definition, shares her preferences
with respect to that one issue: education.377 In this manner, separate school
district elections promote educational governance that better reflects
residents’ views.
This theory of the school district’s superior democratic effectiveness
is unquestionably appealing, and it probably offered a fair representation of
school districts’ democratic functioning up until the Progressive Era.378
Unfortunately, however, intervening factors have since knocked the school
district off this democratic pedestal. In reality, for reasons that will be
explained next, the modern elected school district is, on average, inferior to
the modern elected general government in producing representatives and
policies accurately reflecting citizen preferences.
The key contemporary political trend responsible for the school
district’s decline as a tool for effectuating representative government is
consistently low turnout rates for school board elections.379 In modern
America, voting rates decrease, dramatically, the lower the level of the
government holding the elections.380 Fewer citizens vote in state elections
than in federal elections, and fewer still in local elections.381 On this
smallest level of government, turnout decreases further the more
specialized the government.382 Thus, on average, turnout at school board
377

From the Editors: Mayoral Takeovers in Education: A Recipe for Progress or Peril?, 76 HARV.
EDUC. REV. (2006), http://hepg.org/her-home/issues/harvard-educational-review-volume-76-issue-2
[https://perma.cc/JX4B-MRSR] (“Most citizens do not base their votes for mayor solely on the
performance of the school system . . . . [S]chool boards [thus] retain one big advantage: They are the
only mechanism that provides a direct point of entry for citizens—especially parents—to express their
concerns about education to the very officials who make education policy.”).
378
At the time, since they were topic-specific and less central to the political patronage system,
school district elections facilitated principled participation. E.g., NEWLON, supra note 35, at 243.
Indeed, fierce debates about schools’ role often surrounded board elections, spiking participation. E.g.,
MARGARET LAMBERTS BENDROTH, FUNDAMENTALISTS IN THE CITY 60–64 (2005) (describing how
Protestant and Catholic groups competed for control over Boston schools in the 1880s).
379
JOHN SIDES ET AL., CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS 304 (2012).
380
Charles S. Bullock III, Turnout in Municipal Elections, 9 POL. STUD. REV. 539, 539 (1990). The
phenomenon is striking also in comparative terms. The postwar gap in turnout rates between national
elections and local ones is dramatically larger in the United States than it is in Western European
nations. Robert L. Morlan, Municipal vs. National Election Voter Turnout: Europe and the United
States, 99 POL. SCI. Q. 457, 462 (1984).
381
CHARLES M. KNEIER, CITY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 397–99 (rev. ed. 1947).
382
Curtis Wood, Voter Turnout in City Elections, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 209, 220–21 (2002); e.g.,
Ann Allen & David N. Plank, School Board Election Structure and Democratic Representation,
19 EDUC. POL’Y 510, 516 (2005) (finding that turnout in general elections was three times the rate for
special elections in two cities in 1999).
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elections is a paltry 18%,383 lower than the already depressed rates prevalent
at general local elections.384 In most school board elections, researchers
claim, the central issues are undefined and the candidates’ positions
unclear.385 Minimal campaigning or public interest is involved.386 The
boards operate in a nonpartisan environment, which encourages candidates
to avoid controversial questions.387 Lively public debates are absent even
where researchers anticipated contentious competitions, for example, when
evangelicals (expected to promote a controversial creationist agenda) seek
office.388 Even these candidates tend to avoid such controversial matters in
their campaigns, and, once elected to serve on the board, in the board’s
deliberations and policymaking.389 Everywhere, board elections and public
board meetings materialize as dreary affairs, and school boards proffer little
opportunity for meaningful participation today.390
The cause for this low degree of public engagement in the governance
of a service that still immensely impacts many is debatable. It may be the
homogenous socioeconomic nature of many present-day school districts;391
or voters’ sense that in a now nationalized—even globalized—economy
lower level governments have little effect;392 or the limited media exposure
of lower office holders;393 or the difficulty voters experience, in a political
world no longer based on continuous face-to-face interaction, in assessing
down-ballot candidates’ quality.394
383

KENNETH K. WONG ET AL., THE EDUCATION MAYOR 6 (2007).
City elections, while also notoriously underrepresentative, tend to register somewhat higher
turnout. See Wood, supra note 382, at 223 (finding an average turnout rate of 34% across 57 cities).
385
FREDERICK M. HESS, SPINNING WHEELS 63 (1999).
386
See Frederick Hess, School House Politics, in BESIEGED, supra note 19, at 235 (noting that
campaign contributions play a minimal role in school board elections).
387
HESS, supra note 385, at 65–66.
388
MELISSA M. DECKMAN, SCHOOL BOARD BATTLES: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT IN LOCAL POLITICS
168–69 (2004).
389
Id.
390
MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 388 (3d ed. 1992); see also
MAEROFF, supra note 48, at 9 (finding that citizens hardly attend board meetings).
391
J. Eric Oliver, The Effects of Metropolitan Economic Segregation on Local Civic Participation,
43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 186, 204 (1999) (finding that more economically homogenous cities have lower
political participation).
392
Don Martindale, Theory of the City, in NOEL IVERSON, URBANISM AND URBANIZATION: VIEWS,
ASPECTS, AND DIMENSIONS 28 (1984) (explaining that the “social character of contemporary man is
more shaped by his experience as a national or an ethnic . . . than as a citizen of a city”); H. G. WELLS,
MANKIND IN THE MAKING 381 (Charles Scribner’s Sons ed., 1916) (“Local politics remain . . . more
and more in the hands of the dwindling section of people whose interests really are circumscribed by
the locality. These are usually the small local tradesmen, the local building trade, sometimes a doctor
and always a solicitor . . . .”).
393
Wood, supra note 382, at 213.
394
STEFFENS, supra note 289, at 3 (noting that citizens do not follow local affairs).
384
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Regardless of its root, the prevalent voter apathy creates an opening
for concentrated groups invested in school board elections’ subject matter
to dominate elections and produce bodies unreflective of majority
preferences.395 These groups are either entrenched political machines396
(that treat school boards as employment opportunities and circulate
candidate slates) or teacher unions (whose members, school employees, are
heavily interested and thus form the sole permanent organized interest
group in board elections).397 As dependable and disproportionate suppliers
of votes and campaign funding, these interest groups hold elected school
boards’ ears, and thus receive benefits they desire—whether or not those
benefits are also advantageous to most voters.
Thus, for example, New Jersey’s state takeover of the Newark School
District in 1994—marring future efforts to deploy school resources as
described in the Introduction—was provoked by the gross mismanagement
and corruption of an elected board heeding unions and political operatives,
favoring employees over residents and students.398 And Newark is not
unrepresentative. Everywhere, elected school boards, as data indicates, are
prone to better represent organized groups’ peculiar preferences than the
preferences of the majority of residents who do not participate.399
The upshot is that the current school district is likely to underperform
the broader general government in providing effective reflection of
residents’ preferences. The general government enjoys wider powers, and
its leaders are more visible and can spend more on campaigning. These
factors contribute to higher rates of participation in local elections for
general government posts.400 They also generate a more diverse collection
395

Note, City Government in the State Courts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1598–1600 (1965) (noting
that in part because of voter apathy, “one interest group is often able to impose its conception of the
community on the entire populace” of a smaller city).
396
Martindale, supra note 392, at 21–22.
397
Terry M. Moe, Teacher Unions and School Board Elections, in BESIEGED, supra note 19, at
256.
398
RUSSAKOFF, supra note 11, at 19–20.
399
See SARAH F. ANZIA, TIMING AND TURNOUT: HOW OFF-CYCLE ELECTIONS FAVOR ORGANIZED
GROUPS 166 (2014) (describing the effectiveness of teachers’ unions at influencing school board
elections); L. Harmon Zeigler, School Board Research: The Problems and the Prospects, in
UNDERSTANDING SCHOOL BOARDS 3, 3–5 (Peter J. Cistone ed., 1975) (describing how school boards
are not responsive to the needs of the public); see also NAT’L SCH. BD. FOUND., LEADERSHIP MATTERS:
TRANSFORMING URBAN SCHOOL BOARDS 12 (1999) (noting divergent perceptions of school
performance by school board members and the general public).
400
Thomas M. Holbrook & Aaron C. Weinschenk, Campaigns, Mobilization, and Turnout in
Mayoral Elections, 67 POL. RES. Q. 42, 52 (2014) (finding that lower campaign intensity and spending
result in lower turnout in local elections); see also Neal Caren, Big City, Big Turnout? Electoral
Participation in American Cities, 1 J. URB. AFF. 31, 31 (2007) (noting that voter turnout may be low in
local elections in part because “mayors . . . have less powers than other executives”); Zoltan L. Hajnal
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of interest groups vying for influence over the general government,
rendering it harder for any one individual group to capture the general
government. That government is thus less likely to ignore the preferences
of a major portion of the electorate—let alone of a majority of the
electorate. Therefore, the school district’s historical role notwithstanding, it
can no longer be embraced as an important democratic arena—or even as
one that necessarily tends to improve on the opportunities for
representation offered by the general government.
B.

The Modern School District and Small-Scale Community Building

Participation’s demise as a normative value that can justify the school
district’s political separation from the general government does not
necessarily portend a similar fate for the related interest of small-scale
community building, on whose allure the district’s foundations were often
laid, whether in rural colonial Massachusetts or in Jacksonian Era western
settlements. In fact, even more than participatory ideals, communal notions
are intrinsically associated with the separate school district. As a distinct
entity, the school district’s geographical boundaries may deviate from those
of other governments and align better with “real” communities.401 As seen,
geographically separate, rural school districts survived Progressive Era
agitation precisely because countryside communities perceived district
boundaries as, unlike general government boundaries, overlapping with
their organic community lines.402 Thus even as community building faded
into irrelevance for many urban school districts—which grew at the time
geographically conterminous with cities or counties—it remained not only
relevant, but also ideologically determinative, elsewhere.403
As a normative value, community building still holds much—if not
more—appeal today. The idea of community empowerment through noncity/county local governments is straightforward. Unlike its earlier
predecessors—e.g., the colonial town—the modern general government

& Paul G. Lewis, Municipal Institutions and Voter Turnout in Local Elections, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 645,
645–46 (2003) (comparing turnout rates for national versus local elections); Albert K. Karnig & B.
Oliver Walter, Decline in Municipal Voter Turnout: A Function of Changing Structure, 11 AM. POL. Q.
491, 491–92 (1983) (describing how “citizen apathy, the absence of competition, less money donated to
campaigns, [and] less glamorous positions and candidates” account for lower turnout in local elections
compared to presidential elections).
401
On the distinction between “Gemeinschaft” (community) and “Gesellschaft” (society), see
ROBERT A. NISBET, THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION 47–48 (1966).
402
See supra notes 360–64 and accompanying text.
403
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974) (“[T]he notion that school district lines may be
casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative convenience is contrary to the history of public
education in our country . . . .”).
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does not permit face-to-face interactions between all members as is
believed necessary for true community life.404 Size is to blame: the modern
general government covers too large a territory and population.405
Moreover, it is not organized around one specific institution (like the old
church, town hall, or grazing commons) that all residents frequent and
where they must all interact.406
Because the schoolhouse is such an institution—students and parents
all inevitably interact there—the school district has traditionally offered an
appealing, community-based alternative to standard general governments.407
The promise is premised on a tie that the separate school district offers
between the individual school—in which all members are personally
invested—and school governance—which consequently forces those
members to meet and actively cooperate in decisionmaking.408 Though that
tie dissipated in urban centers with the abolition of ward- or neighborhoodbased representation during the Progressive Era, it lived on in rural areas
where, alongside the one-room school,409 the one-school school district
dominated.410
The problem today is, however, that time did not stand still, even in
the countryside. The middle decades of the twentieth century witnessed a
precipitous decline in the number of one-room schools, and accordingly, of
rural school districts.411 Researchers debate whether rural school district
consolidation was pressed on local communities by external, state-based

404

HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 269–73 (2006); RICHARD SENNETT, THE USES OF
DISORDER 163–71 (1970).
405
Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 84–89 (1998).
406
See RICHARD SENNETT, THE FALL OF PUBLIC MAN 17 (1977) (describing the demise of
common spaces where city residents might interact).
407
See SENNETT, supra note 404, at 190–93 (identifying the school as a place where people of
different backgrounds and interests reconcile their views). Thomas Jefferson thus suggested that
Virginia be divided into smaller political units, “wards,” each centered around one school. JACK
CRITTENDEN, DEMOCRACY’S MIDWIFE: AN EDUCATION IN DELIBERATION 20 (2002).
408
See Aaron J. Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495, 519–20 (2010)
(describing how, in contrast to other units of local government, school districts are “more likely to be
genuine ‘functional communities’” due to the high degree of parent involvement (quoting James S.
Coleman, Schools and the Communities They Serve, 66 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 527, 529 (1985))).
409
FULLER, supra note 249, at 7 (explaining that the one-room school enabled interaction and thus
community building).
410
See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
411
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, MAKING THE GRADE: THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN
SCHOOL DISTRICTS 5–6 (2009) (explaining that the decline in the number of school districts is owed to
consolidation of rural one-room schools); Christopher Berry, School Consolidation and Inequality,
9 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EDUC. POL’Y 49, 49 (2007) (noting that between 1930 and 1970, 90% of
school districts were eliminated through consolidation).
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centralizing pressures,412 or was organically pursued by local communities
desirous for standardized educational modes necessary in the new
nationalized economy.413 The outcome, however, is unquestionable. Today,
even if its geographical boundaries misalign with the general
government’s, the school district tends to encompass more than one school.
Its diverging boundaries no longer mark “genuine” community spaces
centered on a specific school and facilitating community empowerment.414
An example is provided by the Introduction’s East Ramapo Central
School District, whose boundaries bring together communities sharing
exceptionally little and whose members never interact in any school.415 East
Ramapo’s case is unquestionably extreme, but every school district
nowadays is a rather large bureaucratic entity like all other governments.416
It thus can mostly do little to promote the traditional value of small-scale
community building historically associated with it.417
While the separate school district, therefore, probably no longer
promises to stimulate interaction among community members better than
the general government, it definitely can, and does, effectively perform
today another community building function: exclusion of outsiders.418 Two
1970s Supreme Court decisions transformed the school district’s
geographic separation from the general government into an exclusionary
weapon. In 1973, the Court ruled that the boundary separating two school
districts—even those, as in that case, located within one city—may block
tax funds’ redistribution from the rich to the poor district.419 One year later,
it held that such boundaries could also inhibit student integration between
the white and black school districts.420 In tandem, these decisions

412

Berry, supra note 411, at 53–54.
FISCHEL, supra note 411, at 101.
414
See David Strang, The Administrative Transformation of American Education: School District
Consolidation, 1938–1980, 32 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 352, 352 (1987).
415
Acknowledging the reality that general governments may more closely coincide with
community lines than school districts do, Utah creates an easy route for cities within a district to secede
and create a smaller district conterminous with their boundaries. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-2-118
(2017); see also City of Herriman v. Bell, 590 F.3d 1176, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010) (explaining the
rationales for Utah’s law).
416
See Berry, supra note 411, at 49; Strang, supra note 414, at 355.
417
CRONIN, supra note 230, at 6 (arguing that by the 1970s, a consensus emerged that school
boards were detached from actual communities).
418
See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 246 (1990); Daniel Kiel,
The Enduring Power of Milliken’s Fences, 45 URB. LAW. 137, 144 (2013); Erika K. Wilson, Toward a
Theory of Equitable Federated Regionalism in Public Education, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1416, 1420 (2014).
419
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 11–17 (1973).
420
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741–45 (1974).
413
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barricaded school district boundaries, and assured their status as tools for
excluding other community members—those who are poor and minority.421
Recent events in Omaha provide stark illustration of this form of
community building that separate school district geographic lines currently
effectuate.422 Omaha’s municipal lines do not correspond to the
geographical boundaries of any one school district. Instead, the city is
dissected by several districts, some established specifically to fight
absorption into the Omaha Public School District (OPS) covering the inner
city.423 In 2005, a struggling OPS—of whose students 70% are minority and
a larger portion poor—turned to a statute dating to 1891,424 which
empowered the district to annex all other school districts situated within the
city’s municipal boundaries.425 The effort, dubbed “One City, One School
District,” provoked intense opposition from the targeted, and affluent,
separate school districts that lobbied for state reprieve.426 The first
legislative response would have dissolved OPS into smaller school districts
corresponding to alleged community lines.427 Not coincidentally, the three
suggested community-based school districts were racially identifiable.428
Following national uproar,429 the plan was scrapped.430 But affluent
communities’ demands would not go unattended, and the state legislature
did strip OPS of its annexation powers.431
The Nebraska legislature’s insistence on preserving separate school
districts within one city exemplifies the type of power separate school

421

Wayne Batchis, Urban Sprawl and the Constitution: Educational Inequality as an Impetus to
Low Density Living, 42 URB. LAW. 95, 98 (2010); Saiger, supra note 408, at 495.
422
Batchis, supra note 421, at 98 (summarizing a study’s findings showing that areas with small
school districts and increased school district fragmentation were likely to have high levels of school
racial segregation).
423
For example, Westside was established in 1947 by white affluent neighborhoods who
immediately demanded—and received—a special exemption from OPS’s annexation power. Chris
Burbach, ‘70s Decisions Haunt OPS, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 28, 2005, at 1A.
424
NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-409 (2016).
425
See Complaint at 36, NAACP v. Heineman, No. 8:06-cv-00371 (D. Neb. May 16, 2006).
426
JENNIFER JELLISON HOLME ET AL., CHARLES HAMILTON HOUS. INST. FOR RACE & JUSTICE,
USING REGIONAL COALITIONS TO ADDRESS SOCIOECONOMIC ISOLATION: A CASE STUDY OF THE
OMAHA METROPOLITAN 5–6 (2009), http://gs4a.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Holme-UsingRegional-Coalitions.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HZ6-H8B5].
427
A.M. 3142 to L.B. 1024, 99th Leg. (Neb. 2006).
428
Given city demographics, one district was to contain primarily white students, while the others
served minority residents. HOLME ET AL., supra note 426, at 7–8.
429
Sam Dillon, Law to Segregate Omaha Schools Divides Nebraska, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2006, at
A9.
430
L.B. 641, 100th Leg. (Neb. 2007).
431
Id.
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districts currently bestow on communities.432 Separate districts today may
limit interactions with, and therefore responsibility towards, other city or
county residents of different socioeconomic identity.433 This is precisely the
form of community building many commentators deplore as perverse—
since while allegedly reinforcing internal cohesion, it limits interactions
with other individuals, community building’s supposed goal.434
Separate school districts today cannot, as already seen, stimulate such
meaningful interactions, even within their boundaries—their traditional,
and beneficial, community-building function—since those boundaries are
mostly detached from individual schools.435 The twenty-first-century school
district is just as unfit as other traditional governments—cities and
counties—for face-to-face communal interaction through governance.436 At
the same time, and even more than those general governments, school
districts are fit for contemporary attempts to deflect any chance of such

432

Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1274 (Conn. 1996) (arguing that district lines are “the single
most important factor contributing to the present concentration of racial and ethnic minorities in the
Hartford public school system”). The Supreme Court has accordingly held that district lines cannot be
drawn in a manner that will perpetuate segregation. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462
(1972). Another example is Memphis: after the formation of a countywide school district, white,
middle-class communities seceded to form separate districts. Susan Eaton, How a ‘New Secessionist’
Movement Is Threatening to Worsen School Segregation and Widen Inequalities, NATION (May 15,
2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-new-secessionist-movement-threatening-worsen-schoolsegregation-and-widen-inequal/ [https://perma.cc/MQC2-4GYX]. For a discussion of the earlier
formation of the countywide district, see Michelle Wilde Anderson, Making a Regional School District:
Memphis City Schools Dissolves into Its Suburbs, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 47 (2012). A similar
scenario is currently unfolding in Jefferson County, Alabama. The mostly white suburb of Gardendale
is seeking to secede from the countywide school district and form its own district, a move contested in
federal courts for its potential to reestablish segregation. See generally Plaintiffs’ Corrected Objection
to Motion to Operate Municipal School System, Stout v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:65-CV00396-MHH (N.D. Ala. Aug. 29, 2016). The district court reluctantly approved the separation, despite
the fact that the judge was persuaded that “race was a motivating factor in Gardendale’s decision to
separate from the Jefferson County public school system.” Stout v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., No.
2:65-CV-00396-MHH, 2017 WL 1488349, at *56 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2017), supplemented by, 2017
WL 1857324 (N.D. Ala. May 9, 2017).
433
Kiel, supra note 418, at 144.
434
E.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS
140 (1999) (rejecting as a “romanticized sense of togetherness” community building that stresses
homogeneity); YOUNG, supra note 418, at 226–27 (arguing that “city life” is “an openness to
unassimilated otherness”). A somewhat more neutral portrayal of the distinction separates bridging
social capital—which is outward looking—from bonding social capital—which is inward looking.
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 22
(2000).
435
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 794–95 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Bd. of
Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vil. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (banning the creation of a school
district accommodating a religious community).
436
See Mass. Fed’n of Teachers v. Sch. Comm. of Chelsea, 564 N.E.2d 1027 (Mass. 1991)
(discussing parents’ and students’ claim that a district is too broad an entity to represent them).
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interaction with community members who are different.437 Whether this
common impact is perceived as a disadvantage or not, the school district is
simply unlikely to offer an advantage over the general government in terms
of community building in 2017.
C.

The Modern School District and Expertise

As Part II highlighted, throughout the school district’s long American
story, its normative raison d’être oscillated between two diametrical poles:
democracy (i.e., participation and relatedly small-scale community
building) and efficiency (expertise and relatedly stable funding isolated
from popular pressures). As the preceding Sections illustrated, a gulf now
separates the school district from the values of participation and small-scale
community building. This widening gap should bring the district closer to
the opposite ideal of efficient provision of education through expertisedriven governance.
That ideal continues to have normative salience. A plethora of modern
studies show that effective education determines a child’s prospects, and
thus national welfare.438 A clear majority of commentators also agree that
for effective education, specialized knowledge is key.439 Professionalizing
educational services, accordingly, tends to be a rallying cry for activists of
diverse ideological persuasions.440
A separate entity responsible for governing schools has traditionally
served such desired expertise-driven public education by removing power
over the field from political—and inherently lay—governments.441 Hence,
as Section II.C.2 highlighted, Progressive Era reformers grudgingly
embraced the school district once they had inched its operational mode

437

Briffault, supra note 36, at 441–42 (“[T]his results in a local politics aimed at the maintenance
of class and ethnic homogeneity . . . the insistence on separate suburban school districts reflects a
determination to shield local children from exposure to economic, social and cultural differences that
are perceived as a threat to family values.”).
438
MCKINSEY & CO., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS
17–20 (2009); NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., supra note 40, at 15.
439
See Steven G. Rivkin et al., Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement, 73 ECONOMETRICA
417, 419 (2005) (identifying the impact of teachers and high-quality instruction on student
achievement).
440
See, e.g., BENJAMIN MICHAEL SUPERFINE, THE COURTS AND STANDARDS-BASED EDUCATION
REFORM 21–60 (2008) (describing the adoption and growth of education standards through the late
2000s); Press Release, Nat’l All. for Pub. Charter Sch., U.S. Education Secretary Arne Duncan Urges
Public Charter School Supporters to Demand Quality; Children’s Defense Fund Leader Agrees Charter
Sector Must Hold Itself Accountable for Student Success (June 22, 2011).
441
An example of contemporary attachment to this goal is the popularity of charter schools, which,
freed from direct governmental control, are supposedly managed like businesses. Robert A. Garda, Jr.,
Culture Clash: Special Education in Charter Schools, 90 N.C. L. REV. 655, 663 (2012).
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closer to that of the special district. A key way in which the special
district’s legal architecture, unlike that of the general government, could
prioritize expertise was, and is, by legitimizing governance schemes not
based on equal representation, but on the different stakes held by citizens in
the relevant governmental service.442 Those citizens that are more impacted
by the special district’s policies (for example, farmers relying on a water
district’s services) are supposedly likelier to make informed decisions and
elect knowledgeable officials, and hence only they are granted the
franchise.443 So as to promote such informed decisionmaking in the
educational sphere, this logic of the special district thus demanded that a
school board’s election scheme favor parents, and perhaps taxpayers.444 In
this fashion the school district would be superior to general governments—
which hold general, politicized elections—in furthering expert leadership.
But Progressive Era reformers’ aspirations for applying the special
district’s governance template to the school district notwithstanding, the
current school district does not favor the more impacted voters or their
supposed educational expertise and investment in schools’ management.
Indeed, as Section I.B. noted, the school district is legally barred from
doing so. Modern law does not consider the school district to be a typical
special district; instead it now subjects the school district to many of the
rules applicable to general governments—particularly those safeguarding
popular political representation.
Specifically, when New York employed the expertise rationale to
defend a school board election scheme confining the vote to students’
parents, property taxpayers, and their spouses, the Supreme Court would
not accept the rationale.445 The Court clarified that regardless of the
argument’s soundness, the school district was subject to the one person,
one vote rule.446 No resident may be excluded from voting—even if an
inclusive franchise renders experts’ election unlikely. In this regard, in
current American law, the school district is the equivalent of the general

442

E.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 370 (1981).
E.g., Briffault, supra note 80, at 365.
444
See Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 435 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(arguing that “[t]here is no group more interested in the operation and management of the public
schools than the taxpayers who support them and the parents whose children attend them”). Arguably,
taxpayers, even if they do not rely on the schools, have a strong incentive—generated by schools’ effect
on property values—to be concerned with the state of schools. Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants,
and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 1392 (1994).
445
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 630–32 (1969).
446
Id. at 628–29 (explaining that once the school district is made an elected body the one person,
one vote rule is to be applied—regardless of the district’s lack of general governmental powers).
443
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government, not of the special government.447 Relatedly or not, school
boards today are mostly constituted not of experts, but of amateurs elected
by an uninformed electorate: “in a school board election, there are twelve
people up and it’s like throwing six darts at a board, and the six people hit
win the election.”448 Given the dictates of current law, the Progressive Era
goal of insulating board management from political forces inherent to
general elections is by and large unattainable.449
Accordingly, unlike their predecessors whose work was reviewed in
Section II.C, modern writers celebrating the school district’s promotion of
efficient education normally do not cite its supposed promise of apolitical
management. Rather, they highlight the competition between public
providers that the school district’s existence generates, and said
competition’s power to assure the provision of education of the quality and
quantity that residents desire.450 This idea is familiar to any student of local
government law. It draws on the highly influential Tiebout Model: local
governments promote efficiency in the supply of public goods since they
compete among themselves for residents.451 To attract residents, they adjust
their behavior and the products they proffer to the preferences of
residents—in a similar manner to private providers of a good (say cars or
private schools).452 Therefore, the proliferation of options—of providers of
public education—intensifies competition and increases the likelihood that
447

See Briffault, supra note 80, at 353–56.
HESS, supra note 385, at 63. Board members cannot be assumed to be better education experts
than general government officials. They have little opportunity to acquire special expertise: they are
elected for specified terms, and, since in most cases they are unpaid, they almost always have other
jobs. See Jacqueline P. Danzberger, Governing the Nation’s Schools: The Case for Restructuring Local
School Boards, 75 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 367, 369 (1994) (listing criticisms of school boards); Samantha
Sell, Running an Effective School District: School Boards in the 21st Century, 186 J. EDUC. 71, 74–75
(2005) (detailing the arguments against the effectiveness of school boards in the provision of efficient
education); FREDERICK M. HESS, NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, SCHOOL BOARDS AT THE DAWN OF THE 21ST
CENTURY 4 (2002), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED469432.pdf [https://perma.cc/QR5B-GH5J]
(finding that the vast majority of board members are unpaid).
449
See Fumarolo v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 566 N.E.2d 1283, 1309 (Ill. 1990) (foreclosing, at least in
the context of elections for the body actually governing the schools, the possibility of elections by
parents alone—a scheme seemingly even more narrowly tailored to align representation with actual
voter interest and knowledge). Furthermore, in many states, the Progressive Era ideal of appointive—
rather than elective—boards is similarly out of reach. Several constitutions provide that school boards
be elected, in stark contrast to the boards of special districts. E.g., GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 5, ¶ II; LA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 9; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 15.
450
See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1185, 1202
(1996) (“[C]ompetition . . . obligates the government provider to be attentive to the demands of its
constituents.”). For a forceful critique of this conception of education as a consumption good, see
Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23 (1998).
451
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956).
452
Id. at 422–24.
448
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a resident will find the school district providing services meeting her
preferences respecting the quantity, quality, and pricing (embodied in
taxes) of public education.453 Some commentators find empirical backing
for this prediction and conclude that a larger number of individual school
districts in a given area increases schooling’s quality and parents’
satisfaction with it.454 Others hotly contest the finding.455
Importantly, however, this debate revolves around the effect of the
number of governments within a metropolitan area providing educational
services, not necessarily around the effect of those governments’ identity.
In other words, these works ask whether a large number of governments
providing schooling increases efficiency; they do not ask whether
efficiency is increased if those governments whose numbers are enlarged
are separate, as opposed to general, governments. Since, as seen in Part I,
there are hardly any general governments providing education in America
today, it is perhaps impossible to produce a meaningful empirical answer to
this latter question, the one that is of concern to this Article. A sound
comparison between the performance of schools controlled by general
governments and by school districts may simply be unfeasible.456
Theoretical predictions can be made in both directions.457 Since
453

See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Suburbs as Exit, Suburbs as Entrance, 106 MICH. L. REV. 277, 297
(2007); Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and Judicial Intervention,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1057, 1072 (2007); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’
Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE
FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987) and detailing the advantages of decentralized decisionmaking).
454
Caroline M. Hoxby, Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers?,
90 AM. ECON. REV. 1209, 1236–37 (2000).
455
Jesse Rothstein, Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers?
Comment, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 2026, 2036–37 (2007).
456
Some researchers have attempted to assess the efficiency gains attained through mayoral
takeover of school districts (these reforms will be discussed in Part IV). They claim to find gains, e.g.,
Kenneth K. Wong, Does Mayoral Control Improve Performance in Urban Districts?, in WHEN
MAYORS TAKE CHARGE: SCHOOL GOVERNANCE IN THE CITY 64, 79 (Joseph P. Viteritti ed., 2009), but
given the small and skewed sample size, these analyses are at best anecdotal. Furthermore, other
researchers provide contradicting data points. Mayoral Takeovers in Education, supra note 377
(describing the struggles of mayor-controlled districts in Boston and Chicago to maintain student
achievements that earlier researchers had celebrated).
457
In places where the district does not geographically overlap with the general government (and
only in such places), it may enable residents to pick districts separately from their pick of a general
government. Thus, residents can move within the same general government guided in that move solely
by their preference for schooling (rather than the preference for other services, like policing, that are
held constant between the different sites since they are provided by the same general government
reigning over both school systems). The school district thus unbundles the complex product that is the
house. See Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 873–75 (introducing
the idea of the house as a bundled product). At the same time, whether or not the district and general
government geographically overlap, a variety of governments ruling the same area taxes potential
residents’ ability to gather and process information about a potential housing destination, and thereby
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commentators refuse to assume that school district boundaries, as
compared to the boundaries of general governments, are inherently a better
fit for the provision of education (correctly, as the haphazard history of the
district showed),458 separate school districts’ contribution to efficient local
competition is, at best, indeterminate.
The current argument made on behalf of school districts’ efficiency—
their promotion of interlocal competition—is therefore in actuality an
argument for fragmentation and local government control of schools
generally, not specifically for separate school governance.459 The historical
argument for separate school governance’s efficiency did specifically
highlight these separate governments’ superiority to general governments,
by citing school district management’s insulation from political
pressures.460 That argument, however, is no longer applicable due to
twentieth-century legal rulings vindicating general voting rights in school
district elections. Modern law has thereby placed the school district on
equal footing with general governments respecting the capacity to promote
efficient management. Consequently, the contemporary independent school
district can hardly be said to be necessary for the promotion of efficient
education.
D.

The Modern School District and Stable Funding

Regardless of its (in)ability to deliver on the normative values
typically associated with local government—participation, community
decreases the accuracy of the signals sent by their locational choices. If, when moving, a resident needs
to only collect information about one government, she is likelier to make an accurate decision, as
compared to when she needs to gather that same information respecting a plethora of governments, each
responsible for a different service. Shoked, supra note 25, at 1356.
458
If school districts’ coverage areas aspired to represent ideal areas for education provision, they
would have clearly offered the potential of gains in productive efficiency. Gillette, supra note 444, at
1388. However, the Progressive Era claim that district boundaries were not set for this goal is
commonly still followed. As Part II has shown, these boundaries are understood as set with other
concerns in mind. See Briffault, supra note 36, at 384–85 (explaining that school district boundaries are
associated with ideas of parental control and local community). To the extent commentators believe that
these boundaries were once guided by ideas respecting the ideal geographical scope of a school
government, they also assert that those ideas are no longer relevant. See Hoxby, supra note 454, at 1216
(assuming that school district lines correspond to streams located within a county since originally those
offered natural barriers—even though modern forms of student transportation easily overcome them). It
should also be noted that it is unclear what should be the desired, optimal size of school districts.
Research has tried to address the optimal size of individual schools (centering on the effectiveness of
smaller schools), but the question respecting the optimal size of the entity managing the schools is
distinct. See Shoked, supra note 25, at 1370.
459
Roger B. Parks & Ronald J. Oakerson, Comparative Metropolitan Organization: Service
Production and Governance Structures in St. Louis (MO) and Allegheny County (PA), 23 PUBLIUS 19,
28–29 (1993).
460
See supra Section II.C.2.
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building, and expertise—the school district, as a separate political entity,
might provide a more practical benefit: stable school funding. The latter
can be viewed as a component, alongside expertise, in promoting
efficiency: the provision of effective education to the nation’s youth. As
Part II illustrated, past legislators often held this view when empowering
school districts. The post-Independence Massachusetts legislature provided
taxing powers to school districts in order to combat towns’ financial
neglect of schools.461 Similar later acts were adopted in response to parents’
angst over student fees.462 These moves reflected a state-level judgment that
education carried wide-ranging benefits—in modern economic parlance,
positive externalities—not registered by existing local governments, which
underinvested in education relative to its true social value.463 States
searched for tools to subsidize education’s provision so that it fully
produced its positive externalities. They settled on a separate government
with an independent, dedicated revenue stream.
As in those earlier times, schools today are also struggling with
devastating financial shortfalls,464 and tools propping up their standing are
still in high demand.465 Unfortunately, the school district is no longer such a
tool. Due to a century’s worth of financial and legal developments, a school
district’s political independence is now irrelevant to the task of easing
schools’ financial crises. Indeed, it might at certain times intensify those
crises.
To a great extent, the school district’s historical potential to reinforce
school financing was born of specific historical circumstances, rather than a
quality innate to the institution. As noted, in the nineteenth century an
autonomous revenue source for schools had to be identified, since, beyond
drying up receipts from federal land grants, schools received no funding
from upper level governments.
By the mid-twentieth century however, the necessity of a distinct local
school funding mechanism was waning fast: the state was assuming an

461

See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text.
463
See, e.g., Barbara L. Wolfe & Robert H. Haveman, Social and Nonmarket Benefits from
Education in an Advanced Economy, in EDUCATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 97, 118–19 (Yolanda K.
Kodrzycki ed., 2002) (discussing positive externalities associated with an additional year of schooling).
464
Kristi L. Bowman, Before School Districts Go Broke: A Proposal for Federal Reform, 79 U.
CIN. L. REV. 895, 904 (2011) (describing spending by, and outstanding debts of, school districts).
465
See, e.g., James W. Guthrie & Arthur Peng, A Warning for All Who Would Listen—America’s
Public Schools Face a Forthcoming Fiscal Tsunami, in STRETCHING THE SCHOOL DOLLAR 19, 21
(Frederick M. Hess & Eric Osberg eds., 2010) (describing how school districts occasionally become
insolvent, sometimes requiring states to oversee such districts).
462
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aggressive role in school funding.466 Evolving ideas respecting education
and government’s duties may have contributed, but the new responsibility
was often thrust on states by court decisions.467 Starting in the 1970s, more
than half of the state supreme courts interpreted their constitutions’
educational clauses as mandating minimal funding for schools.468
Consequently, the majority of states now set a per-student amount of
funding each district must enjoy, and enforce formulas to subsidize districts
that cannot autonomously raise those amounts.469 States thus regulate local
educational spending’s floor.470 The state’s role does not end there,
however. Some states also enforce a ceiling.471 Most have some sort of limit
on tax rates school districts can charge.472 A few go further, dictating the
specific tax rate to be raised for schools or the portion of local revenues
dedicated to schools.473 Many states simply deprive districts of fiscal
powers: school boards submit budgets to the appropriate general
government for approval and tax levying.474
Whether or not the school district preserves its formal fiscal
independence, almost everywhere the state thus both finances local schools
and polices local revenue and expenditure levels.475 In East Ramapo, for
example, the state, not the school district, guarantees minimal support for

466

Berry, supra note 411, at 54.
Sheila E. Murray et al., Education-Finance Reform and the Distribution of Education
Resources, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 789, 789 (1998); e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal.
1971); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Sec’y of the
Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d
1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
468
For a summary by state, see SCHOOLFUNDING.INFO, http://www.schoolfunding.info
[https://perma.cc/3GV6-ZME4].
469
Liz Kramer, Achieving Equitable Education Through the Courts: A Comparative Analysis of
Three States, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 15–18 (2002).
470
In 2014, $288.6 billion of school systems’ revenue came from the state, $52.9 billion from
federal sources, and $276.2 billion from local sources. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, G14-ASPEF, PUBLIC
EDUCATION FINANCES: 2014, at xi (2016).
471
Daniel R. Mullins, Fiscal Limitations on Local Choice, in STATE AND LOCAL FISCAL POLICY
201, 203 (Sally Wallace ed., 2010) (noting that all but three states enforce such ceilings).
472
E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-972 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387.195 (West 2017).
473
California’s constitution actually requires such legislation. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 21.
474
Only thirty-four states still have fiscally independent boards. MAEROFF, supra note 48, at 31.
Even in those states, some districts are deprived of the power. E.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2576
(McKinney 2017).
475
Sharon N. Kioko, Structure of State-Level Tax and Expenditure Limits, 31 PUB. BUDGETING &
FIN. 43, 46 (2011). The resultant negation of local autonomy can count as unconstitutional. Neeley v.
W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 797–98 (Tex. 2005) (striking down a
school tax cap as amounting to a state tax).
467
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schools.476 Within the current contours of American law, the school
district’s separation from general governments is mostly irrelevant for the
purpose of sustaining minimal funding levels the state deems necessary.
Worse still, in many states the effect of the school district’s separate
standing on school funding is not neutral: it is sometimes detrimental.
Inevitably, the school district’s detached political status generates a
competition over revenues with other local governments drawing on the
same property tax base. Each government’s political leader craves a larger
portion of the joint income pie to employ for the attainment of visible
achievements within her responsibility field—at the expense of
expenditures in fields for whose performance she herself is unaccountable
to voters. A mayor will seek to capture local resources so she can spend
them on street improvements, park expansion, police services, and the like,
rather than on the schools for which she is not responsible. A school board
official will seek to seize those same resources precisely for this latter
use—the only one for which she is responsible. In this competition, the
playing field may be tilted against school districts’ leaders. Districts’ fiscal
powers are almost invariably more constrained than those of other local
governments.477 At the same time, general governments may employ legal
tools—most prominently, tax increment financing (TIF)—to divert some of
the school district’s portion of local tax revenues into their own coffers.478
The TIF’s rise serves as a sad coda to the school district’s promise of
guaranteeing funding for schools. The district is immaterial today as a tool
to assure adequate financing—as that assurance is now provided by the
state. The independent school district may actually defeat the goal of
expanding school financing opportunities by incentivizing general
governments, released of schooling responsibilities, to take measures to
reduce educational funding.
476

The New York Court of Appeals has held that the state is constitutionally obliged to ensure the
availability of a “sound basic education” to all its children. Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch.
Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369–70 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1982). Consequently, the state provides local
districts with subsidies to meet minimal funding standards. Id.
477
MAEROFF, supra note 48, at 31–33.
478
Under a TIF, a territorial district is created within a city, and revenues generated by applying the
tax rate to increases in property values within the district above the values at the time of its creation are,
for the life of the district, set aside and paid to the city alone (to the exclusion of all other local tax
authorities, such as the school district, covering the TIF district), supposedly for further improvements
within the district. Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the
Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 67 (2010). TIFs have consequently
been costly to some school districts. Rachel Weber et al., The Effect of Tax Increment Financing on
School District Revenues: Regional Variation and Interjurisdictional Competition, 40 ST. & LOC. GOV.
REV. 27, 37–40 (2008) (noting that while TIFs have benefitted rural and certain urban districts such as
Chicago, other urban districts were harmed by TIFs).
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E.

Summary: The Modern School District’s Normative Deficiencies

This Part’s analysis indicated that today, unlike in the past, the
independence of the school district is not normatively worthwhile. That is
not to say that the normative values that originally, as seen in Part II, gave
rise to the school district in American law are no longer relevant. Those
values—representation, small-scale community building, expertise, and
stable funding—each still enjoy strong backing among thinkers, courts, and
policymakers. The problem is that modern developments have handicapped
the independent school district’s ability to surpass the general government
in the delivery of these goals. Low turnout and interest group dominance
render school districts an inferior representative arena. School district
consolidation detached districts from “genuine” communities; still worse,
court decisions transformed school districts into mechanisms for excluding
community members. Other court rulings, proclaiming that the school
district is not a special district, mean that its potential for expertise-driven
management cannot surpass the city’s. The state’s commandeering of
school-funding duties decreased the significance of the school district’s
independent standing for financing purposes; due to intergovernmental
competition over resources sometimes that standing is now financially
detrimental.
Currently, in sum, the school district fails to outperform the general
government on every normative value; on three (participation, community
building, and stable funding) it potentially, if not actually, underperforms
it. Thus, the special place American law has for centuries reserved for the
school district no longer appears justifiable. If questions remain, they are
not about the functioning and potential of the school district: they are about
the functioning and potential of American law without the school district.
The Article’s next, and final, Part addresses those possible questions.
IV.

BEYOND THE SCHOOL DISTRICT

If a separate local government for education is not normatively
superior to the local general government, the latter should gain authority
over the field. In local government law, cities and counties are the default
local governments: as general governments they wield most powers
reserved to localities. Thus, in and of itself, Part III’s conclusion should
lead lawmakers to consider school districts’ abolition and transfer of
educational powers to general governments—a move facing no legal
impediments in most states, as all local governments are state creatures.479
479

E.g., Fruit v. Metro. Sch. Dist. of Winchester–White River Twp., 172 N.E.2d 864, 866 (Ind.
1961) (holding that an act compelling school district consolidation was not invalid under the state
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Still, its normative desirability and legal ease notwithstanding, this
suggested move represents a break from a longstanding practice of
American law, as Part II related. Thus an overview of its practical effects
may be helpful. This concluding Part outlines the potential workings of the
general government once tasked with governing schools.480 Specifically, it
demonstrates how these workings can advance the normative values
traditionally ascribed to local control of education, as identified in the
preceding Parts.
To draw a full image of the suggested reform’s potentialities, the
discussion is divided into two Sections. The first Section underlines the
congeniality of general governments’ modern structure to effective control
of education, highlighting that structure’s capacity to negotiate competing
values of participation and expertise. The second Section singles out legal
mechanisms that will enable general governments, once in control of
education, to transcend challenges of scale and alleviate the tension
between interests in community building—necessitating small-scale
governments—and in shoring up school funding—which benefit from
economies of scale. Each Section will also introduce the pertinent existing
reforms to school governance some states have already toyed with in the
last few years.
A.

Structure: Balancing Representation and Expertise

Once awarded powers over education, how will general governments
handle the responsibility? Some readers, even if persuaded that the school
district is an ineffective institution, may be apprehensive about the city or
county taking charge. Given the negative image of city politics dominating
American consciousness and law,481 they may contemplate with dread the
answer to the question. But in actuality the answer is reassuring. The
source of skepticism is the paucity of precedents for cities governing

constitution, notwithstanding township disapproving vote); Tuohy v. Barrington Consol. High Sch.
Dist. No. 224, 71 N.E.2d 86, 91 (Ill. 1947) (holding consolidation and detachment of school districts
constitutional); State v. Bd. of Educ. of Chetopa, 252 P.2d 859, 868–69 (Kan. 1953) (“[T]here are no
vested rights in the existence of a school district and . . . the legislature has authority to extend or limit
its boundaries, consolidate two or more as one, or to abolish a district altogether.”). But see Mendoza v.
California, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 505, 529 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (striking down mayoral takeover of the Los
Angeles school board).
480
The choice between city and county will depend on the size of the relevant community. Another
potential model can be found in states that currently have school districts’ boundaries which correlate to
both county and city lines, as seen in Section I.C.1.
481
See Frug, supra note 20, at 1109–20; Michael Tager, Corruption and Party Machines in New
York City, 3 CORRUPTION & REFORM 28, 30 (1988). See generally MORTON & LUCIA WHITE, THE
INTELLECTUAL VERSUS THE CITY (1962).
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education, not cities’ governmental structure.482 This Section will show that
through their existing institutional architecture, cities can now effectively
merge expert management with democratic accountability in school
administration.
On the expertise side of the equation, the general government of the
twenty-first century is no alien to the production of complex services.
Education is not dissimilar to other highly professionalized services general
governments already provide—e.g., policing or transportation—and for
which they have developed over the twentieth century robust organizational
frameworks.483 Namely, while the general government’s political bodies—
e.g., mayor and council—set general policies in such fields, actual
management is vested in experts—e.g., the police or transportation
department.484 Political involvement is delineated: the department head—
police or transportation commissioner—is a mayoral appointee (often
subject to city council confirmation)485 but lower ranked managers and
employees are civil servants.486 An education department within the general
government will function in a similarly professional manner.487 No less than
an independent government for education, an education department within
city government could thus be a hub of expertise run by professionals.
Furthermore, such a department may promote efficient management
even better than the existing independent school district, since it will
interact with the city’s other professional departments.488 In reality, as
opposed to current institutional design, education is never disconnected
from other local policies: for example, the location and size of schools is
dictated by land-use decisions, while in turn, schools’ location and size
482

In addition, nowadays, school districts are just as prone to mismanagement and corruption as
cities, and it is far from clear that their public image is better than that of general governments. For
example, in Newark, during the years it was still elected, the school board was at least as dysfunctional
as city government. RUSSAKOFF, supra note 11, at 19–20.
483
WONG ET AL., supra note 383, at 6 (“[I]f democracy can be trusted to safeguard our social
services, police forces and other essential services, why wouldn’t it work to protect our most precious
resource, our children?” (quoting New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg)).
484
E.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE tit. 2 (2016) (creating departments and commissions).
485
Id. § 2-102-020 (specifying that the mayor appoints the transportation commissioner subject to
council approval); id. § 2-84-040 (specifying the same for police superintendent); N.Y.C., N.Y.,
CHARTER ch. 1, § 6 (2009) (“The mayor shall appoint the heads of administrations, departments, all
commissioners . . . .”).
486
On civil service laws, see 3 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 12:124, Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2017).
487
Robert H. Salisbury, Schools and Politics in the Big City, 37 HARV. EDUC. REV. 408, 421–22
(1967) (noting the mistaken assumption that under city control, professionals will lose their
prominence).
488
Michael D. Usdan, Mayoral Leadership in Education: Current Trends and Future Directions,
76 HARV. EDUC. REV. 147, 149 (2006).
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have marked effects on the surrounding built environment;489 schools
require transportation accommodations and police support; and aid to poor
students is not confined to the classroom.490 In current law, however,
education’s management, vested in a separate government, is severed from
the management of these other services. Prospects at coordination and
better overall performance are inevitably hampered. In a role reversal,
therefore, if awarded control over schools, the general government, by
integrating all disparate services under one roof (through disparate
professional departments operating within one city hall), could be the better
purveyor of professionalism for educational management as compared to
the school district.
This stance has been embraced by many state legislatures.491
Dismayed by urban schools’ performance, and pinning part of the blame on
the supposedly unduly politicized school district, they turned to the general
government as antidote.492 Starting in the late 1980s, laws were passed
conferring control over several major cities’ school boards on mayors, as
mentioned in Section I.C.2.493 These acts are promoted as serving a
professionalized, business-like approach to school management.494 Often
they follow a state takeover of school districts graded “failing”—indicating
disquiet over school districts’ vices and faith in city management’s
virtues.495
But city control of schools, as suggested here, is promising not only in
these terms of professional management already associated with mayoral
489

See, e.g., Gurba v. Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 155, 40 N.E.3d 1, 7–8 (Ill. 2015) (holding that the
school district was subject to municipality’s zoning powers and hence could not construct higher
bleachers for a football stadium that negatively affected the property values of surrounding properties).
The result was enacted into Illinois law in late August 2016. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13-27 (2016).
490
See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 400 (N.J. 1990) (noting that poverty, poor housing,
poor nutrition, and other conditions linked to poverty affect children in a manner that is likely to
depress their educational performance).
491
DAVID R. BERMAN, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE STATES 126 (2003).
492
WONG ET AL., supra note 383, at 31, 40 (discussing the takeover of school districts in Boston
and New York); Alan D. Bersin, Making Schools Productive, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (June 5, 2005),
http://legacy.sandiegouniontribune.com/uniontrib/20050605/news_lz1e5making.html [https://perma.cc/
J4MA-CS59].
493
For a list of appointed boards, see NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, SELECTION OF LOCAL SCHOOL
BOARDS (2009), https://www.nsba.org/sites/default/files/reports/electionschart.pdf [https://perma.cc/
M4C4-QEHT].
494
Jeffrey R. Henig, Mayoral Control: What We Can and Cannot Learn from Other Cities, in
WHEN MAYORS TAKE CHARGE, supra note 456, at 25 (“[I]n many of the places that have adopted
mayoral control, state legislators and civic leaders have simply concluded that the school boards they
have tried to work with are amateurish . . . .”); Joseph P. Viteritti, Why Governance Matters, in WHEN
MAYORS TAKE CHARGE, supra note 456, at 5–7.
495
WONG ET AL., supra note 383, at 30–47 (discussing Chicago, Cleveland, Hartford, and Detroit
as examples).
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control: it portends gains in the terms of the other important normative
component of governance—democratic participation. Current reforms
instituting mayoral control of schools are often criticized for their failings
in this regard.496 Inevitably, the suspension of elections for school boards in
favor of mayoral appointees interferes with representation values.497
Minority groups have especially felt sidelined.498 In some cities, the
mayoral-control scheme’s unpopularity led to its downfall.499 Even where it
persists, mayoral control is often temporary, conditioned on periodic
legislative renewals,500 because, as seen in Section I.C.2, the school board is
still not legally integrated into city government.501 Conversely, this Article
suggests full integration. Such reform will not only improve on this stopgap
nature of mayoral control, but also, and more importantly, addresses
mayoral control’s substantive weakness—its democratic deficit.502 Full
integration entails education’s subjection to full city/county governance—
not solely to the mayor.503 Through their council representatives,
communities will supervise educational decisionmaking—as they supervise
all other local decisionmaking.504

496

See 1 COMM’N ON SCH. GOV., FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON SCHOOL GOVERNANCE
16–17 (2008) (recommending that mayoral control of the schools be reformed to allow for more input
from parents).
497
Courts have upheld the practice regardless. Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 393–94 (6th Cir.
1999); Cohanim v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 2d 452, 455 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Harrisburg Sch.
Dist. v. Zogby, 828 A.2d 1079, 1092–93 (Pa. 2003). But see Mendoza v. California, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d
505, 508–09 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
498
Jeffrey R. Henig & Wilbur C. Rich, Mayor-centrism in Context, in MAYORS IN THE MIDDLE 3,
18 (Jeffrey R. Henig & Wilbur C. Rich eds., 2004).
499
WONG ET AL., supra note 383, at 45–49 (discussing Detroit and Washington, D.C. as examples).
500
E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-49(h) (Westlaw 2017) (requiring the state board to renew the
order placing a school district under state control every three years); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-b
(McKinney 2017).
501
New York City is a partial exception. The board—appointed by the mayor—was rendered
advisory, deprived of executive powers. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-g (McKinney 2017). The power to
“[c]ontrol and operate” the school was vested in a chancellor, serving at the mayor’s pleasure. Id.
§ 2590-h. Still, other democratically elected city bodies have no powers over the schools. City of New
York v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 2010 WL 3069654, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that “[w]hatever
his status vis-à-vis the City,” the Comptroller has no relationship to the school board, and “the City and
the Board remain separate legal entities” (quoting Perez ex rel. Torres v. City of New York,
837 N.Y.S.2d 571 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007)); see also Perez, 837 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
502
DOROTHY SHIPPS, SCHOOL REFORM, CORPORATE STYLE 4 (2006) (critiquing mayoral control).
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Jackson, Mississippi, offers an interesting example. Since 2010, the mayor appoints board
members but they must be confirmed by the council. Still, the board maintains its separate legal
standing. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 37-7-203(3) (Westlaw 2017).
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WONG ET AL., supra note 383, at 22 (arguing that the problem of mayoral control is
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Such supervision should be more democratically effective than current
school board elections. As Section III.A stressed, participation rates in
general local elections are higher than in school board elections and thus
general governments are less prone to special interest capture. Moreover,
limited existing experience indicates that when general governments wield
educational powers, education immediately tops the list of debated generalelection topics.505 Thus not only can the general government offer efficient
management—through its professionalized departments—it also promises
democratic gains, through more truly popular elections.506
As Part II’s historical investigation discovered, American law
recognized the school district because general governments were
nonexistent, or once existent, were imperfect facilitators of meaningful
participation and unpalatable conduits for expert management. That view
of city politics, though, is now anachronistic. With municipal services’
professionalization and their—at least partial—detachment from old-style
political machines, the city, even if not an optimal management body, often
offers better prospects for expertise and representation than the school
district.507 Some states acknowledge this reality, and turn to mayoral
control. Yet these reforms do not go far enough organizationally, while
going too far normatively. They maintain the legally separate school
board—with its attendant financial costs—but centralize control in one
person—with its attendant democratic costs. Striking a better balance
between expertise and representation values, the full integration of
education into general governments will improve on this scheme—and on
the still-prevalent separately elected school board scheme.
B.

Scale: Balancing Community Building and Stable Funding

Modern general governments’ internal structures are thus probably up
to the task of effectively running schools. But would their external
boundaries not obstruct the effort? Unlike school districts, general
governments were not created with education’s governance in mind.
Accordingly, some may be concerned that these governments’ geographic
coverage areas might be too big (inhibiting efforts at community building
505

Id. at 28.
Id. at 20 (noting that relative to board elections, general elections are high-profile, not single
issue, and hence interest groups have less influence).
507
In an indication that boards are now prone to corrupt practices characteristic of old city
machines, states pass acts setting special ethics duties for them, prohibit their interference in
professional affairs, regulate their reimbursement practices, etc. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-63
(Westlaw through Act 10 of 2017 Legis. Sess.); LA. STAT. ANN § 17:81(P) (Westlaw through 2017 First
Extraordinary Sess.). Both laws were adopted in the aftermath of breathtaking school district corruption
cases.
506
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through schools) or too small (increasing costs and undermining stable
school funding). Of course, as Part III highlighted, current school districts
themselves are not particularly hospitable to either value.508 But to soothe
remaining doubts, this Section identifies two mechanisms now available to
general governments that enable them to transcend their scale’s potential
limitations: micro-local reforms (allowing general governments to
accommodate smaller communities), and interlocal agreements (allowing
them to capitalize on economies of scale).
As seen in Part II, general governments were not tapped to run schools
partially because those governments’ large scale normally diverges from
the boundaries of genuine communities centered around individual schools.
But today, a legal fix is available for this handicap. The fix was developed
since that handicap now also afflicts, as Section III.B demonstrated, the
school district. To reattach education governance to the individual school,
states recognize school-level councils, operating underneath the existing
school district.509 These micro-local entities can engage in the communitybuilding function to which the local government governing the schools—
currently the school district—cannot contribute. Over the past two decades,
many states have established such site-based councils consisting of
teachers, parents, and other community members, albeit only as advisory
bodies.510 In a small, though growing, number of places these councils also
hold meaningful powers, determining curriculum and hiring teachers.511
These prevalent micro-local reforms—especially if their reinforcement
presses on and spreads—can answer the challenge of effective community
building under a government, like the general government suggested here,
that may cover a large area and population.
While capacity for community building is a (solvable) challenge
generated by the general government’s bigness, another potential
challenge—the capacity to assure stable funding—is presented by the
general government’s smallness. Any service’s provision benefits from
economies of scale: as the service’s scope expands, the cost per unit of
added service decreases since fixed costs are spread over a larger number
of output units.512 Since some costs of construction, administration, and
teaching are fixed, it is cheaper to operate one school serving four hundred
508

Generally, the effects of the size of a governing body on education quality are unclear. Berry,
supra note 411, at 56–57 (reviewing contradictory findings).
509
For an overview, see Shoked, supra note 25, at 1341–43.
510
Shoked, supra note 25, at 1341.
511
E.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/34-2.3(1) (2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 160.345(2) (West
2017).
512
RONALD J. OAKERSON, GOVERNING LOCAL PUBLIC ECONOMIES 16 (1999).
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students than to have four schools, each serving one hundred students.513 A
general government might be too small physically to draw on these
economies of scale.
This worry about the limits set by the general government’s potential
small size is exaggerated, if not misplaced. Legal units routinely overcome
the economic constraints set by physical smallness through the plainest of
legal devices: contracts. Thus already today, general governments that
cannot independently realize economies of scale achieve them through
cooperation with neighboring general governments.514 The law enables
these agreements that local governments regularly employ to jointly
provide diverse services such as policing and transit.515 For educational
services too, existing school districts often contract to permit interdistrict
student transfers, to rely on other districts’ special education facilities, and
more.516 Thus an individual general government’s physical smallness would
not jeopardize its effective operation and financing of schools. The small
general government will contract around the problem.
Some may contend, however, that a general government’s financial
drawbacks in operating schools will stem not from its inability to
economically fund schools, but from an unwillingness to sufficiently fund
schools—a problem for which contractual solutions are irrelevant. This
concern relates not to the general government’s physical size, but to its
substantive scope: since the general government holds many
responsibilities—not only education—it may choose to spend its revenue
elsewhere.517 But this is an imaginary concern. As explained in Section
III.D, state governments dictate minimal levels of school funding. Hence,
the general government, if awarded responsibility for the schools, like the
school district responsible for them today, will never be free to wholly
underfund schools.518 If it opts not to fund schools beyond state-mandated
minimal levels—prioritizing other local services, say policing or economic
development—that decision, responding to a democratic and economic
513

BERMAN, supra note 491, at 132.
See Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 190, 210–
12 (2001) (describing various motivations for such interdistrict contracts).
515
ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, METROPOLITAN AMERICA:
CHALLENGE TO FEDERALISM 87–88 (1966).
516
E.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 1950 (McKinney 2017) (setting a framework for interdistrict
“cooperative educational services”).
517
Salisbury, supra note 487, at 424.
518
See Town of Dartmouth v. Greater New Bedford Reg’l Vocational Tech. High Sch. Dist.,
961 N.E.2d 83, 93–94 (Mass. 2012) (holding that a local agreement to divert school funding was
preempted by state law); Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of New York v. City of New York,
362 N.E.2d 948, 950–51 (N.Y. 1977) (upholding the state’s power to bar the city from reducing the
share of its budget apportioned for schools).
514
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calculation of citizens’ needs and wants, is normatively justified. Whether
or not education needs win out this democratic and Tieboutian calculation,
such an informed competition between local issues will represent an
improvement over current allocation patterns.519 As Section III.D
documented, the division of funds between schools and other local
priorities is today often the product of the much less principled bureaucratic
competition between local entities (general government and school
district).520
Combining schools’ management with the management of other local
services does not portend inherently worse, or less rational, patterns of
allocation of funds to the school system. Neither, as this Section explained,
does it threaten encumbering that system with impractical physical
boundaries. The move to commit educational powers to general
governments—suggested here—does not imply that educational services
and policy will invariably be pegged to those entities’ boundaries. Under
city or county rule, some decisions could be made on a scale smaller than
the city or county—i.e., on the individual school level—to serve
community-building interests. Other decisions could be reached on a scale
larger than the city or county—i.e., on the state or interlocal levels—to
serve financing interests. In its suggested role as focal point for education
governance, the contemporary general government materializes as a
promising arbiter of activities taking place on disparate local levels and as a
fair assessor of the demands of disparate policy needs.
C.

Summary: Why the General Government?

The general government is an appealing alternative to the school
district’s dominance in the educational field not solely due to the latter’s
failings—identified in Part III—but also thanks to its own potential,
established in this Part. Thanks to its existing structures—political leaders
elected in contested general elections who supervise an administration of
civil servants—the general government can effectively reflect residents’
preferences and promote professionalized management; thanks to legal
mechanisms—micro-local individual school councils and interlocal
contracts—it can overcome limits of scale to accommodate smaller scale

519

There is reason to believe that due to its political salience education will be strongly positioned
in the competition over resources among the city’s multiple responsibilities. See, e.g., Wong & Farris,
supra note 109, at 231–32 (describing how once education becomes a city concern, media coverage
increases and elected officials allocate more attention—and resources—to it).
520
See also Irby v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352, 1355 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that one
justification for appointed boards is avoiding fragmented fiscal responsibility).
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decisionmaking for community-building purposes and larger scale
cooperation for money-saving purposes.
That is not to say that granting general governments control over
education will cure all the maladies afflicting American schools:
meaningful racial integration may require regional bodies;521 equitable
funding may require more state involvement;522 elevated overall quality
may require federal intervention.523 But some pitfalls currently besetting the
school district-dominated system will be avoided if general governments
run the schools. Recall the Introduction’s East Ramapo and Newark.
Awarded educational powers, the villages and towns in East Ramapo
whose residents are actually concerned with public education will
undoubtedly contract to jointly operate schools—achieving economies of
scale without seeing school funding diverted to other purposes by officials
unconcerned with public education. For its part, if asked to run the schools,
the City of Newark’s leadership, elected in broad, competitive elections,524
could not continuously mismanage school funds and favor employees as
easily as the old elected board of the school district did.525
In 2017, unlike in times past, there is limited reason to fear city
power; conversely, there is much reason to fear school district power.
Already-adopted steps to empower mayors or school-level councils
indicate the weakening hold of the school district on the American legal
imagination. That, however, is not enough. The school district’s grip
should be fully dislodged, for only then might the full potential of local
control be unleashed.
CONCLUSION
Many school districts throughout the country are flourishing. In all
likelihood, most readers have either attended, or sent children to, a school
in one of these thriving districts: districts that are the opposite image of the
East Ramapo and Newark districts that launched this Article. These
successful districts, serving relatively affluent communities, often live up to
521

See Wilson, supra note 418, at 1421–24 (stating that “metropolitan fragmentation, in
conjunction with localism, creates inequalities between neighboring localities” and suggesting
regionalism as an alternative to localism in public education (citations and footnotes omitted)).
522
See Laurie Reynolds, Full State Funding of Education as a State Constitutional Imperative,
60 HASTINGS L.J. 749, 758–59 (2009) (“Because some of the largest gaps between rich and poor school
districts occur in states with the lowest percentage of state funding, most state funding reform
involves . . . an increase in the percentage of the state’s share of the total education budget.” (citations
and footnote omitted)).
523
E.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2012) (identifying the purpose of federal supervision).
524
See RUSSAKOFF, supra note 11, at 13, 206–08 (describing Newark’s general election contests).
525
Id. at 19.
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the school district’s original promise: highly trained professionals offer
outstanding education to students; residents actively participate in elections
and debates over contested issues; funding is never a concern; and
communities rally around schools through PTAs, extracurricular activities,
and the like.526 In other words, expertise, participation, stable funding, and
community building—all the values historically associated with the school
district—are alive and well in those districts today.
But as this Article illustrated, even there these values are sustained not
thanks to the institution of the school district, but despite it. Even in the
best functioning of school districts, the general government, if awarded
educational powers, should easily meet the performance standard set by the
school district. In many other school districts—the lesser functioning of
school districts—the general government would normatively outperform
the school district. The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable: three hundred
years in, the time is ripe for American law to consider setting aside that
uniquely American oddity, the school district.
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